EIA Tabulates Drops in Russian Natural Gas, Coal, and Oil Exports After War Sanctions: This is One Measure of Sanctions Effectiveness

     Hitting Russia’s energy exports is a key strategy to economically battling the regime’s brutal war of aggression against Ukraine. It is a strategy that has worked to a limited extent, but one that could be working much better if there were more coordination between countries and more consequences for those who are both buying Russian energy and taking advantage of the price controls enacted by the sanctions to get that energy cheaper than they otherwise would have gotten it. Counties like India and China are profiting from that pricing, basically profiting off the sanctions as well as limiting their effectiveness. This was tolerated at the beginning as an acceptable outcome. However, I do not think that it was expected that these countries would increase their buying of cheap gas and oil to the extent that they have. In one way, it is a slap in the face of the sanctions and the countries that have enacted the sanctions. In another way, it has enabled a sanctions-evading infrastructure and methodology to develop globally that involves clandestine shipping, clandestine transfers, blocking of navigation systems so ships can’t be tracked, and utilization of uninsurable ships that present potentially catastrophic environmental issues if there are spills. There has already been a collision between two ships due to one ship turning off tracking.

     The EIA keeps data and has published some graphs, shown below, of the changes in export output and export destinations for Russian natural gas and Russian coal. The EIA points out that gas pipelines from Russia have much more capacity to transport gas to Europe than to Asia. Russia has been working on developing the large Power of Siberia 2 Pipeline, which is expected to transport gas from Russia through Mongolia and into China. This will take time and only relieve some of China’s natural gas demand. It could be helpful to Mongolia, allowing it to potentially transition some from coal to natural gas for power generation. China and Russia have yet to fully agree on some aspects of the 2000-mile, large-diameter pipeline. It will take years to build.  

     The EIA noted in August that Russia’s oil and condensate exports have only decreased slightly since 2022 due to increased buying from Asia. The second graph below shows unequivocally that India has been the main buyer of Russian crude oil since 2022. 

     Before the war, India purchased a very small percentage of Russia’s oil and condensate, but quickly ramped that up to 35% in 2023 and 36% in 2024 and 2025. They basically show that India has been a strong economic supporter of Russia’s invasion. I agree with the Trump administration’s recent stance that India’s profiteering and sanctions-busting activities are in need of adjustment and should be counteracted. Modi might talk about peace, but is funding war and India. Tolerance is wearing thin.  

     Most of Russia’s rail infrastructure for delivering coal is also oriented toward Europe rather than Asia. Since the peak of Russia’s coal exports in 2021, they have dropped by about 25%. The story is similar to gas and oil, where the shift of exports has gone from Europe to Asia. For coal, China is the main buyer by far, with India buying a little more coal than previously.

References:

 

Russia’s natural gas and coal exports have been decreasing and shifting toward Asia. EIA. Today in Energy. September 3, 2025. Russia’s natural gas and coal exports have been decreasing and shifting toward Asia - U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA)

Russia's oil exports have decreased modestly since 2022, shifting toward Asia. EIA. Today in Energy. August 7, 2025. Russia's oil exports have decreased modestly since 2022, shifting toward Asia - U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA)