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Tuesday, January 31, 2023

Risk Assessment, Risk Management, and Risk Perception

 

This is adapted from my 2021 book, Sensible Decarbonization: Regulation, Risk, and Relative Benefits in Different Approaches to Energy Use, Climate Policy, and Environmental Impact

     Risk assessment can be generally defined as “the process of characterizing the potentially adverse consequences of human exposure to an environmental hazard.” Risk management can be defined as “the process by which policy choices are made once the risks have been determined.” A committee of the National Research Council (NRC) in 1983 came up with a four-step process for risk assessment: hazard identification, dose-response assessment, exposure assessment, and risk characterization. The council was established in 1916 to advise the federal government on science and technology.

Hazard identification: The determination of whether a particular chemical is or is not causally linked to particular health effects. Dose-response assessment: The determination of the relation between the magnitude of exposure and the probability of occurrence of the health effects in question. Exposure assessment: The determination of the extent of human exposure before or after application of regulatory controls. Risk characterization: The description of the nature and often the magnitude of human risk, including attendant uncertainty.[1]

     Hazard identification also involves consideration of the nature and strength of the evidence that a substance presents a hazard. Dose-response assessment includes consideration of intensity of exposure, patterns of exposure, and age and lifestyle of those exposed that might affect susceptibility. Often animal responses must be extrapolated to human responses and low-dose responses must be extrapolated to high-dose responses. Exposure assessment also involves characterization of emissions: determining the magnitude and properties of emissions at different points that result in exposure. When emissions can’t be directly measured and analyzed, modeling is used. Modeling is of course prone to more errors. Risk characterization is more or less the final stage of assessment where exposure and response are analyzed together to predict probabilities of specific harms. This should also include the distribution of risk in a population. Risk assessment is what we use to arrive at risk management: “Risk assessment is a set of tools, not an end in itself. The limited resources available should be spent to generate information that helps risk managers to choose the best possible course of action among the available options.”[2] The goal is to move toward quantifying risk better and to not over-rely on qualitative or descriptive risk assessment which is more subjective and more prone to error. Methods like cost-benefit analysis attempt, often inadequately, to quantify risk.

     The ISO 31000 standards define risk management as “the effect of uncertainty on objectives.” Risk management involves the “identification, evaluation, and prioritization of risks. It also involves minimizing risk and monitoring risk. We can see that uncertainty is part of the very definition of risk which suggests that risk is a probability, a predictive process. More specifically it is a probability of certain impacts. Risk is often presented as a set of options. Risks are ranked into a hierarchy of choices prioritized according to threat level.[3]  

     Using the NRC definition, basically, one wants to know what is dangerous, how much of it is dangerous, what is the likelihood of exposure at those levels, and what should be concluded about those risks to inform policy. Dose-response and exposure are very important. We can measure chemicals present in the environment at minute levels in parts per billion or even smaller amounts like parts per trillion in recent times but that does not mean those levels will elicit any biological response at all. If there is no plausible avenue of exposure, then there may be little to no actual risk. Dose-response data is widely available for some pollutants at different doses, but effects of lower doses must be extrapolated for others. Uncertainty and sparseness of data are two problems for risk assessment even though improvements through time are expected. Thus, data is important for risk evaluation. That data should be widespread, applicable and relevant, have good coverage and sufficient in number (not sparse), and be accurate. It should be evaluated with the best science and policy prescriptions and options should consider all costs and benefits in some sort of cost-benefit analysis. Periodic re-assessment of risks can be important. Insurance companies must constantly evaluate data in order to calculate financial risks, weather risks, crime risks, property liability risks, etc. Accurate prediction of these risks allows them to set rates and avoid payouts that could have been prevented with better predictive risk management. “If risks are improperly assessed and prioritized, time can be wasted in dealing with risk of losses that are not likely to occur.”[4]  

     The National Research Council recommended organizational and administrative separation of risk assessment, which is strictly scientific, and risk management, which involves policy decisions based on science. They define risk management as a “decision-making process that entails consideration of political, social, economic, and engineering information with risk-related information to develop, analyze, and compare regulatory options and to select the appropriate regulatory response to a potential chronic health hazard. The selection process necessarily requires the use of value judgments on such issues as the acceptability of risk and the reasonableness of the costs of control.”[5]

     Types of risk include operational risk, market risk, credit risk, asset liability management, natural disaster risk, so-called climate risk which overlaps natural disaster risk, information technology risks like cyberwarfare, and a myriad of health, safety, and environmental risks. Risk communication is a subject that involves communicating risks to the public. Public health and safety agencies are concerned with risk communication. Yale has a climate change communication program that involves communicating the risks of climate change and which researches “public climate change knowledge, attitudes, policy preferences, and behavior, and the underlying psychological, cultural, and political factors that influence them.”[6] They also engage the public and companies, organizations, government, and media. However, they seem to have some significant bias toward climate alarmism. Climate alarmism and the precautionary principle are closely related. As the blogger Riskmonger noted, precaution is uncertainty management and uncertainty management is not risk management. It is risk avoidance. At the other extreme is ignoring risk, which is also not risk management. It is risk acceptance. We need a balanced approach to risk, of course.

 

 

Personal Quantification of Risk Involves Human Psychology and Neurobiology: Risk Perception

     Neuroscientists say that when we are confronted with potential harm, we are hard-wired for a fear-response before our logic kicks in. This is not true in all situations but can and often does affect how people respond to risk. One’s risk response is based on one’s risk perception. Often there is a gap between perceived risk and real risk. The gap can be influenced by our own amygdalar response system which is our ‘fight-flight-freeze’ instinct. It can also be influenced by current events, media portrayals, how the issue is framed, whether we can easily choose to avoid the perceived risk or not, cognitive biases, how well we can control our exposure to the risk, and whether the risk is natural or man-made. We also calculate risk based on our prevailing interpretation of the facts before us. The high-risk of Covid has certainly activated instinctual reactions as it is a real danger. Our prefrontal cortex is involved in our more logical approach to risk which we need to use to override the amygdalar, fight-flight-freeze system, which evolved to protect us from very real imminent threats, which we rarely encounter in modern times compared to past times.

     A great book exploring risk perception, including its cognitive and psychological aspects, is How Risky is It, Really? Why Our Fears Don’t Always Match the Facts, by David Ropeik. There are several risk perception factors. Ropeik notes that we are hardwired to fear first and think second. Often when making decisions about risks we must do so without having all the facts. When that is the case, we use mental shortcuts that include heuristics and biases. We each have a risk response that involves both facts and these mental shortcuts. How we view things often depends on how they are presented to us, especially by those we generally trust. How things are presented is often called “framing.” This is where the media and the extremism of both environmentalists and anti-environmentalists comes into play and is why headlines and narrative control are deemed so important. Those who control the headlines and narratives do the framing. The same data can have quite different effects on risk perception depending on how it is presented and how amenable the audiences are to those presentations. Trust is also an issue that can be manipulated. We can extrapolate that to companies too. If Monsanto and Exxon are regularly depicted as ruthless profit seekers who care little for people that might be affected by their products, then it is easy to distrust them. People also tend to distrust entities and situations in which they have no control or influence. Evidence suggests that perceived lack of control in a traumatic situation leads to higher rates of PTSD. Ropeik also notes that natural risks are tolerated easier than human-caused risks. We worry about man-made pesticides but not about natural pesticides, some of which can be far more dangerous. Genetic engineering is deemed unnatural and thus dangerous. Biolabs that work with pathogens are deemed risky, especially if groups like the Organic Consumers Association present them as having nefarious intentions verging on bioterrorism. New risks are often deemed more dangerous than familiar ones, especially if they are amplified by the media simply by focusing more on them. Risks that affect children or the poor and disadvantaged are deemed more dangerous. If a risk seems unfair, we tend to deem it more dangerous. Another risk perception factor is lack of control. We tend to distrust what we can’t control. This is perhaps why many perceive the risks from industrial activities to be more dangerous than they probably are. Its’s not something over which they can exert any control. If people feel powerless, they are more likely to overstate risks rather than understate risks.[7]

     There is also obvious evidence that risk perception is different for different people, at least for personal risk. Some people, so-called daredevils, thrive on personal risk while others avoid it. Most of us are somewhere in the middle of the spectrum in our approach to both novelty and risk.[8] It is also the case that favoring risk taking or risk aversion can be a function of ideology, education, parental and social training. To some extent we tend to take on the views of those around us. Those views may affect the risk perception gap between real risk and perceived risk in either direction. Strangely, microbial parasites and gut bacteria have also been suggested as affecting our level of risk-taking. The so-called reward system of the brain is also likely to be involved in risky behaviors such as dangerous addictions. As I mentioned above there are also cognitive biases like “loss aversion” where we tend to want to keep what we have (stasis) rather than risk it for something potentially better (dynamism). This can result in what psychologists call the “endowment effect,” where we can overvalue something we have acquired, particularly something we have struggled to acquire, or something involved in our evolutionary fitness. Another cognitive bias is the “negativity bias” whereby we tend to have a bigger bank of negative remembered experiences about things and events that involve uncertainty, so we are predisposed towards pessimism. Adam Thierer notes in his book Permissionless Innovation that “innate pessimism and survival instincts combined with poor risk-analysis skills” influence people to distrust technology to the point of inducing “technopanics.”[9] As mentioned above, the availability bias perpetuated by newsworthy negativity being ever-available, also psychologically primes us for pessimism. Strongly biased websites and news sources that let us scroll an echo-chamber parade of eco-pessimistic stories can put both negativity and availability biases into hyperdrive.  

     Folk wisdom, or folk psychology, also often involves health, safety prevention, preparation, and risk. Common sayings like “to err on the side of caution,” “a stitch in time saves nine,” “better safe than sorry,” and even “if there’s three let it be” regarding poison ivy leaves, are a few of many examples. We have these sayings because way back in time someone figured out the advantages of being prepared and preventing unnecessary harm. It also seems very likely that natural selection would favor preparation and detailed knowledge about dangers. We memorize safety protocols and sayings are a convenient way to memorize. We are wired to survive, often through knowledge about our relationships to the specific environments we encounter. Thus, we quantify risk all the time. However, we do it both rationally and irrationally due to our neurobiological circuits, our logic, our social dispositions, and our psychology. Often the folk wisdom is correct, but it can also be incorrect at times leading to bias and even danger. Most people in a community do not have accurate and detailed knowledge of industrial and technological processes so this makes their risk assessments generally inadequate. It also makes it easier to inflate risks and less often to deflate risks. Adequate risk assessment requires the assessors to be as knowledgeable as possible.

     The irrationality of risk has played out recently with conspiracy theories about the dangers of 5G communications technology, which like 3G and 4G before it, puts out some harmless non-ionizing radiation, well within limits that could cause any damage. Long before the beginning of the rollout, alarmists were warning about the dangers of 5G and even before that the long-term use of cell phones was suspected by many as being potentially carcinogenic. As the rollout began, in some places amidst the beginnings of the coronavirus pandemic, anti-5G activism was stoked in online groups, apparently influenced by Russian trolls, on both the right and left fringes of the political spectrum and culminated in vandalizing and burning new cell towers in many places in Europe and other places.[10] One reason for that was a conspiracy theory that took hold that 5G was somehow spreading the Covid or lowering immunity or even that it was all a plot by Bill Gates and the World Health Organization to infect us so they could vaccinate us, or something to that effect. This is obviously just ignorance and fear. Dr. Eric van Rongen, vice chair at the International Commission on Non‐Ionizing Radiation Protection, which sets the global guidelines for phone makers and telecommunications companies on how much radiation is safe for humans, says those fears are baseless and the dangers of 5G are equivalent to the heat dangers of having a cup of tea every two hours.[11]

     There are people all along the spectrum from being risk tolerant to being risk averse. Daredevils are risk tolerant. Others will decidedly avoid high-risk situations. Norwegian polar explorer Erling Kagge suggests that exposing oneself to risk helps to make life more meaningful and helps one to develop a more mindful presence approach to life. If we habitually avoid risk, we may have more regrets. Risk perception plays a part here too. Kagge notes that one of his heroes, the famed mountain climber Tenzin Norgay, didn’t die on a mountain but died from lung cancer due to smoking. Thus, we may get good at mitigating one kind of risk but fare poorly in mitigating other kinds of risk. Kagge seems to suggest that too much risk avoidance is a kind of laziness that may give us regrets and other kinds of less evident risks.[12]

     A recent article in Undark Magazine unpacks some interesting ideas about risk perception related to the January 6 Capitol riots. The article notes that research has shown that risk perception changes for those that see threats to their status or identity and that it varies according to demographics, particularly for white males who are more willing to take risks to preserve their status or identity. Intense support sometimes verging on fanaticism is given for a president who supports their concerns and elevates their status and identity crises. The article notes research from 1994 led by Paul Slovic that asked 1500 Americans how they perceive different risks. The results showed that white males differed in risk perception from white females and from both non-white males and females. In every threat category white males perceived the risks as smaller and more acceptable than the others. They dubbed the findings “the white male effect.” Subsequent studies have confirmed the effect in America and suggested that differences in cultural identity, socioeconomic security, and different attitudes toward egalitarianism and community are involved. Some have attributed this to white privilege, or more specifically to white male privilege. More recently came the term “white nationalist privilege.” A similar study done in Sweden in 2011 showed no discernible difference between men and women in risk perception and thus no white male effect there. Equality between the sexes is thought to be very good in Sweden. However, they did find that risk perception was significantly higher in Sweden among those with foreign origins and ethnicities. Those non-native Swedes have less privilege and less of a sense of equality in that society than native Swedes. The researchers concluded that the white male effect observed in America was really a subset of what they proposed as the “societal inequality effect.”[13] [14]

     We are wired to detect and respond to threats. Our pre-logical threat circuits can be triggered easily, especially when we are in a hyped-up state. They can also be manipulated by shrewd politicians or activists of any orientation. Human rights activist, lawyer, and author Zach Norris writes about these human tendencies regarding threats and safety and how they are manipulated. He gives a general framework “Us vs. Them” scenario where “they,” the proposed perceived enemy, are typically dehumanized and compared to diseases in terms like “contagions, germs, pollutants, infections.” These are things we must act against to remain safe. He thinks the US under-invested in social welfare and over-invested in punishment. He argues for a care-based model of public safety rather than a fear-based model. I tend to agree to a point.[15]       



[1] National Research Council (US) Committee on the Institutional Means for Assessment of Risks to Public Health. Washington (DC): National Academies Press (US); 1983.  Risk Assessment in the Federal Government: Managing the Process. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK216628/

 [2] Committee on Risk Assessment of Hazardous Air Pollutants. Board on Environmental Studies and Toxicology. Commission on Life Sciences. National Research Council, 1994. Science and Judgement in Risk Assessment. National Academy Press.

 [3] Wikipedia entry – ‘Risk Management.’ Accessed Sept. 2020. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Risk_management

 [4] Ibid.

 [5] National Research Council (US) Committee on the Institutional Means for Assessment of Risks to Public Health. Washington (DC): National Academies Press (US); 1983.  Risk Assessment in the Federal Government: Managing the Process. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK216628/

 [6] Yale Program on Climate Change Communication. https://climatecommunication.yale.edu/

 [7] Ropeik, David, 2010. How Risky Is It, Really? Why Our Fears Don’t Always Match the Facts. McGraw-Hill.

[8] Gallagher, Winifred, 2011. New: Understanding Our Need for Novelty and Change. Penguin Books.

[9] Thierer, Adam, 2014, 2016. Permissionless Innovation: The Continuing Case for Comprehensive Technological Freedom. Mercatus Center at George Mason University.

[10] Satariano, Adam and Alba, Davey, April 11, 2020. Burning Cell Towers, Out of Baseless Fear They Spread the Virus. New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/10/technology/coronavirus-5g-uk.html/

[11] Van Rongen, Dr. Eric (as told to Elle Hardy), June 23, 2020. I'm the scientist who sets the global guidelines on 5G safety. Take it from me: 5G doesn't cause cancer or spread COVID-19. Business Insider. https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/technology/im-the-scientist-who-sets-the-global-guidelines-on-5g-safety-take-it-from-me-5g-doesnt-cause-cancer-or-spread-covid-19/ar-BB15S0Ty

[12] Kagge, Erling, April 16, 2020. Polar explorer Erling Kagge: Why risk makes life meaningful. Big Think. How to be happy, with polar explorer Erling Kagge - Big Think

 [13] Buni, Catherine and  Chemaly, Soraya, January 7, 2020. The Science That Explains Trump’s Grip on White Males. Undark. https://undark.org/2021/01/07/science-trump-grip-white-male-effect/

 [14] Olofsson A, Rashid S. The white (male) effect and risk perception: can equality make a difference? Risk Anal. 2011 Jun;31(6):1016-32. doi: 10.1111/j.1539-6924.2010.01566.x. Epub 2011 Jan 14. PMID: 21232063. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1539-6924.2010.01566.x

 

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