I recently saw a
Facebook ad from ‘Behind the Markets’ that said: “The largest energy source
on Earth was found near the Grand Canyon, and Wall Street hasn’t caught on yet.”
I have seen other memes hyping Fervo’s FORGE project in conjunction with the
DOE as well. While Fervo has crossed some excellent milestones in its Enhanced
Geothermal projects, one it has yet to cross is proven profitability. What
those ads don’t say is that after the company’s IPO, shareholders have lost $10
billion since its stock price peaked in May. However, according to Elliot
Yearsley, in an article for GeoExPro, Fervo may have worse problems than that
going forward.
As a clean energy technology,
geothermal has significant bipartisan support. It can provide baseload energy,
where applicable. Where it is applicable is where there is relatively shallow
subsurface heat, or a higher geothermal gradient, and that keeps it
geographically limited to the U.S. West and Southwest, generally not too close
to population centers, except in California, where conventional geothermal has
long been developed at high costs. Can Fervo’s EGS model, which can be produced
in hot rock that is also dry rock, be competitive with conventional geothermal?
Maybe and maybe not. If it could be profitable, it could expand the limited
geographical area where geothermal could be developed, but it would still be
mostly confined, more or less to the same regions, and would not require
tapping directly into hydrothermal systems, which can create operational
challenges like corrosion, induced seismicity, and drilling difficulties like
lost circulation.
Dave Waters, a geoscience
consultant at Paetoro Consulting UK Ltd., noted in a LinkedIn post about EGS
risks that only about 2 or 3 projects globally are producing commercially, but
none has proven life-cycle commercial success. Fervo has clearly found
significant technical successes, including operating in hotter rock, drilling
faster, drilling cheaper, etc., but operational reliability and power
production metrics are now the challenges. Fervo needs to be able to increase
its cash flow organically by producing significant amounts of power and keeping
it in production. It is nowhere near that point now, and despite its technical
improvements, its planned projects still have high upfront costs. Waters’ post
emphasizes that long-term success is an important metric for geothermal
projects and considerable uncertainty will remain until more long-term analysis
is available, which will take time. Simply meeting initial LCOE targets may not
be enough if there are operational problems, drops in flow rate, water loss,
and thermal decline that manifest over time. These unknowns keep EGS risky.
Waters writes:
“We have a handful of commercial production projects,
all quite geologically different, progressing to different productions in
different commercial environments, and it will be some decades before the
extent of any commercial success or failure is truly, fully known.”
“LCOE of geothermal EGS, being a retrospective look at
costs and rewards from a success case plant perspective, does not on its own
provide a useful comparison with the LCOE of surface options that have
relatively low risk of commercial failure - i.e. compared to subsurface routes
with very big expenditures before any technical feasibility is or is not
demonstrated. The inherently unrisked nature of LCOE calculations
underestimates the relative cost of options with significant pre- (or post-)
FID risk.”
Geothermal, in general, has been
annoyingly overhyped in the media. These new technologies can expand
geothermal’s geographic range and improve its economics a bit, but the
economics remain challenging and it sure as hell cannot compete with fossil
fuels, which will remain much cheaper. Scaling geothermal will take decades, at
least. Commercialization of EGS and AGS is just beginning and has yet to be
proven economically viable. Technical challenges remain as well.
Yearsley’s article in GeoExPro
explores some of those challenges by examining Fervo’s models, the operations
data they have released (and withheld), and the likely operational problems
encountered. He examines parasitic pump loads, which are considerable with the
injectors. He also explores the company’s value and financing schemes. Yearsley
and Henk Kombrink pointed out in November 2024 that Fervo overstated the
expected flow rate and underestimated the pressure loss between the injector
and producing wells at its Project Red in Nevada. Yearsley and Kombrink
predicted that the power output would be 1.3 MW rather than the 3.5 MW Fervo
was touting. In an April 2026 article, they note that their suspicions were
confirmed as output for the project was estimated at 1.4 MW. They missed their
target due to higher thermal decline than expected and more water loss than
expected. The data also suggests that pressure drop was higher than expected.
Higher pressure drop means that injection pressure would have to be increased
via powered pumps, resulting in higher parasitic loads on the system. Fervo
blamed the issues as first-of-a-kind problems that would be overcome in their
Cape Station Project. Yearsley also suggests that Fervo has not been
forthcoming with all of its data.
“At Cape Station, Fervo’s self-published paper in 2024
claimed that a 30-day production test achieved “a sustained output of 8-10 MW”.
But the production rate was in fact not shown by their own data to be sustained
over the 30 days, or even during the brief period of data that was shown. Fervo
omitted the production rate data for 29 days of the 30-day test and did not
include any injection rate data.”
“They also neglected to deduct the power required for
the re-injection pumps, which used about 30% of the gross power ascribed to the
production well (See Appendix 1 for pump power calculations). Critical
questions of well productivity, production decline, and water loss were left
unanswered at the time, and are still unanswered more than two years later. No
further well test results have been shared by Fervo, a surprising omission
considering that this is an unproven technology with no operating history.”
“To increase the production rate at Cape Station over
Project Red, Fervo drilled longer horizontals, used two injection wells to one
production well, and also significantly increased injection pressure.”
“The result was still dismally low net power produced
per well drilled, much lower than conventional geothermal wells. This low well
productivity is likely the main contributor to the stubbornly high development
costs at Cape Station, which has apparently finally dawned on Fervo. Only days
before their IPO, Fervo revealed that their capital expenditures (Capex) would
be $7,000 per installed kilowatt of capacity, not the $6,000/kW that they had
predicted just the year before.”
Another issue they bring up is
that they are using gross capacity rather than net capacity, failing to deduct
the 30% parasitic load penalty due to reinjection. That brings their maximum
possible capacity factor/utilization rate to 70%. There will still be
inevitable thermal decline and some maintenance issues that will drop capacity
factors further. The authors looked at a nearly perfect scenario with a
capacity factor of 67% and a more realistic capacity factor of 50%. The 67%
scenario was calculated to an internal rate of return of 6%, and the 50%
scenario has an IRR of just 3%. They calculated the cost of capital at 7%.
Thus, an IRR below 7% is below breakeven and loses money. If Fervo can drop its Capex to
$5,500/kW as it hopes to do, that would give an IRR of 8% for the 67% CF
scenario and an IRR of 5% for the more realistic 50% CF scenario. Thus, they
conclude that even if Fervo reaches its goals, its profitability would hover
near or slightly below breakeven.
Yearsley goes on to analyze
Fervo’s financing and suggests they may have to raise more money for Phase 2 of
the Cape Station project. He does not believe they were accurate in saying that
EGS has been proven commercial at scale. It may be at some point, but the
evidence suggests that it is not now. They may have trouble raising more cash
due to the lower stock price. Higher electricity prices would help their
economics and could save them, but that is not guaranteed.
“To convince shareholders, investors, and lenders that
they have a viable business model, Fervo will have to prove (not just
speculate) that after burning through almost $3 billion so far, they will be
able to vastly improve well productivity, achieve a near-perfect operating
record, suffer no production shortfalls, and experience no material temperature
declines or water loss. For that, they will need time. But having rushed their
IPO and started the clock, they are running short of time and credibility.”
Below are the pump power
calculations Yearsley used, followed by his analysis of economic inputs.
It will be interesting to see if
they can further reduce costs, parasitic loads (which Yearsley thinks is
unlikely), and the thermal decline rates that appear to be higher than for
conventional geothermal.
References:
How
Fervo is digging a deep financial hole: Fervo’s much-heralded success in
raising money in their Initial Public Offering for their Enhanced Geothermal
projects has come unravelled, with shareholders losing some $10 billion since
the peak in May of this year. As bad as the collapse of their share price is,
Fervo actually have bigger problems. A legacy of omissions, inaccuracies, and
their own inexperience has put them in a deep financial hole that they will
need time to dig out of – if at all. Elliot Yearsley. GeoExPro. November 5,
2026. How
Fervo is digging a deep financial hole - GeoExpro
How do
we risk the commercial success of geothermal EGS projects in 2026? LinkedIn
post. Dave Waters. Post
| LinkedIn
A
critical look at Fervo dataset suggests lower output: Net power of enhanced
geothermal project may be only a third of the number that is generally quoted. Elliot
Yearsley and Henk Kombrink. GeoExPro. November 6, 2024. A
critical look at Fervo dataset suggests lower output - GeoExpro
Has
enhanced geothermal been proven at scale? Comments and opinion based on
information released by Fervo on Project Red. Elliot Yearsley and Henk Kombrink.
GeoExPro. April 23, 2026. Has
enhanced geothermal been proven at scale? - GeoExpro