Insights from Carl Sagan and Maria Popova
Several important minds of the
past recognized the humanizing and democratizing effects of science. Bertrand
Russell wrote in 1926: “Without science, democracy is impossible.” Carl
Sagan, in his last book in 1996, ‘The Demon-Haunted World: Science as a Candle
in the Dark,’ wrote about the humanizing powers of science and its importance
to democracy. According to Maria Popova, in a 2015 article in The Marginalian,
this book also discussed “how applying the scientific way of thinking to
everyday life refines our intellectual and moral integrity.” I read Sagan’s
1977 thought-provoking book on the evolution of intelligence, ‘The Dragons of
Eden,’ in the 80s before I decided on a science major in college.
Humans are faced with questions we
can’t answer, and uncertainty is always present. Popova quotes Sagan from the
Demon-Haunted World:
“Avoidable human misery is more often caused not so much
by stupidity as by ignorance, particularly our ignorance about ourselves…
Whenever our ethnic or national prejudices are aroused, in times of scarcity,
during challenges to national self-esteem or nerve, when we agonize about our
diminished cosmic place and purpose, or when fanaticism is bubbling up around
us — then, habits of thought familiar from ages past reach for the controls.”
The implications are simply that
science, however imperfect, is the best tool we have to make sincere attempts
to address those difficult and impossible questions. In that sense, says Sagan,
science is like democracy, which is also imperfect, but also the best tool we
have. Thus, one could say that science and democracy are the best tools we have
for bettering ourselves, but they are not without some flaws. They are tools
that lead us to decisions.
Sagan from the Demon-Haunted
World:
“The scientific way of thinking is at once imaginative
and disciplined. This is central to its success. Science invites us to let the
facts in, even when they don’t conform to our preconceptions. It counsels us to
carry alternative hypotheses in our heads and see which best fit the facts. It
urges on us a delicate balance between no-holds-barred openness to new ideas,
however heretical, and the most rigorous skeptical scrutiny of everything — new
ideas and established wisdom. This kind of thinking is also an essential tool
for a democracy in an age of change.”
Sagan asserted that absolute
certainty is elusive, so we must settle instead for small, incremental
improvements in our understanding of many subjects. He called this “an
asymptotic approach to the Universe.” He opined that uncertainty could only
be reduced, not eliminated, noting:
“The error bar is a pervasive, visible self-assessment
of the reliability of our knowledge.”
He emphasized that science was
self-correcting, which makes it more or less immune to the influence of most
dogmas, as adherence to the method is its primary feature. This makes science
humble, he said. All scientists know they are sometimes wrong in their
hoped-for conclusions. To have humility is to always be fair, regardless of the
effects. In science, one must always adhere to the method, regardless of the
effects. Even well-established science sometimes has to be corrected in the
light of new information. Thus, science is always being refined. Disproving
established beliefs and valid criticism are encouraged in science.
Sagan from the Demon-Haunted
World:
“Science is a way to call the bluff of those who only
pretend to knowledge. It is a bulwark against mysticism, against superstition,
against religion misapplied to where it has no business being. If we’re true to
its values, it can tell us when we’re being lied to. It provides a mid-course
correction to our mistakes.”
Insights from ‘Democratizing Science’ by Paola Mattei
Science was questioned and mangled
in many ways during the COVID pandemic. Anti-science forces came to the
forefront amid backlash against science. The 2023 book, ‘Democratizing
Science,’ by Paola Mattei, explores public trust and public engagement of
science. This includes backlash against science and public participation in
science, such as citizen science. I am in favor of citizen science in general.
However, some manifestations of it have been biased, such as groups of biased
environmentalists doing amateurish citizen science for the sole purpose of
catching industry pollution occurrences. According to the book’s introduction,
which is all I have read, it:
“…explores the perils of adopting a ‘populist’ approach
to science policy not driven by intellectual curiosity…”
I think that COVID showed the
difficulty in translating science into policy. Public trust is science has been
eroded somewhat in what they call the post-truth society. The proliferation of
fake health news, quack cures, and distrust in basic science is perhaps
encompassed in the Trump administration’s appointment of cabinet members who
are not qualified in science. RFK Jr is perhaps the prime example. People do
have a right to believe what they want, regardless of what science says.
Perhaps the issue is how science could possibly impede that human right to
believe what one wants. What makes these issues perhaps more difficult is that
there is no shortage of scientists, those trained in science, who reject
mainstream science and embrace much less likely viewpoints.
“In Western liberal democracies, we are experiencing a
significant decline in trust in scientific authorities. The attacks against
science are organized by groups that advance their own cultural domains and
systems of beliefs, such as religious groups, industry groups (challenging the
existence of climate change, for instance) and social movements (for example,
the movement against the use of pasteurized milk in the United States embraced
by famous public figures). These groups hold views against scientific knowledge
and defend their beliefs as sacred ideologies that are not subject to
analytical and critical questioning.”
The book is Euro-focused and
concerned with educational systems and the influence of populism, particularly
European radical right populism, which has been growing in recent years. Here
in the U.S. and to some extent in Europe as well, there is also radical left
populism. The notion of adopting draconian rules against carbon emissions
promoted by the radical left is one possible implication. On the right, there
is the notion of doing the opposite, or promoting draconian rules against
regulating emissions in any way. Thus, the problem of populism is basically one
of adopting extremist views, whether extreme left or extreme right.
Insights from George Sarton and Alison Wylie About
Humanizing Science
An October 2022 paper in the
Journal of Canadian Philosophy by Alison Wylie, ‘Humanizing Science and
Philosophy of Science: George Sarton, Contextualist Philosophies of Science,
and the Indigenous/Science Project,’ explores the ideas of George Sarton from
1924. Sarton called science “our greatest treasure,” but also warned
that it should be humanized to keep it from doing more harm than good. He
emphasized that science was dynamic and ever-changing, noting that “fixed
knowledge is dead knowledge.” Perhaps Thomas Kuhn exemplified this best in
his early 1960s book, ‘The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,’ which argued
that paradigm changes in science are often slow, as new knowledge must not only
replace old knowledge but also entrenched views about that old knowledge.
Sarton also noted that science is a collective enterprise as well as a social
one.
“In short, the fierce commitment to rigorous inquiry
that Sarton prized above all else must be “tempered by … humility and charity,”
a “broadness of outlook and boundless generosity”
The paper focuses mainly on
archaeology and its impact on and need for engagement with indigenous
populations. Sarton, like Sagan after him, emphasized the importance of
humility in science. Kuhn did as well in addressing the problem of entrenched
views in developing consensus. One must be humble in conceding that new
knowledge can replace established knowledge. In the paper’s conclusion, Wylie
notes the following:
“Sarton advocated for the sciences: that we learn from
“the thoughts and ideas of other people,” especially critical voices within
philosophy and those whose ways of investigating and understanding the natural
and social world diverge from our own, and that we attend to values and
interests that have typically not been addressed by scientific inquiry.”
Insights from ‘Why Democracies Need Science’ by Harry
Collins and Robert Evans
In a 2017 book by Harry Collins and
Robert Evans, ‘Why Democracies Need Science,’ the authors put forth an idea
they call “elective modernism,” explore the continuity of science (even when
new ideas are adopted, many older ideas remain a part of the explanation), and
the morality of science. It also explores the nexus of science and policy and
the value of expertise. They write:
“The attacks on science come from many sources. From the
outside, science is beset by post-modernist analysis that sees no truth, only
‘accounts’; it is beset by environmentalist critiques that see science as an
instrument of ecological disaster; and it is beset by political regimes that
see value only in economic terms, or, in America, can make political capital by
contrasting science unfavourably with religion.”
“Most social analysts think that democracy needs
protecting against scientific and technological experts; we argue that
scientific and technical experts have the potential to protect democracy!”
In considering the morality of
science, we should consider for whom the science is being conducted. Nazi
scientists had aims in line with their fascist government, and similar
governments we may consider immoral also have scientists working to their
benefit.
The authors divide the
sociological study of science into three waves. Wave 1, from the early
twentieth century to the early 1960s, involved great faith in the scientific
method. Wave 2 coincides with the publishing of Kuhn’s influential book, which
showed that paradigms in science were based not only on sheer truth but also on
consensus. It was an acknowledgement that there are social contexts to
scientific findings. Wave 2 also revealed that expert advice depends on social
assumptions. This, they say:
“…led to arguments in favour of the democratization of
science, and of expertise more generally, in order that the interests and
priorities that inevitably coloured expert advice would better reflect the
concerns of the wider society.”
While Wave 2 explored the pitfalls
of technocracy, Wave 3 returns to technocracy, or rule by experts, but the
definition of expert changes from those with specialized knowledge to a more
inclusive definition involving different kinds of expertise. They note
society-wide ubiquitous expertise, specialized expertise, and meta-expertise as
types and divide specialized expertise into interactional expertise and
contributory expertise.
They note that experience-based people who are not
experts, but who are key stakeholders in the decisions made by experts, should
have some influence over those decisions, as Wave 2 seems to advise. They
divide Wave 3 into a technical phase and a political phase. For the technical
phase, they note:
“…the normative claim is that technical advice should be
provided in such a way as to minimize the effect of political bias and
influence. This means that technical advisors should not exaggerate the
certainty or impact of their work in order to influence the political decision,
and that decision-makers should not demand that engineers and scientists draw
firm conclusions when this cannot be done.”
The political phase is how the
ideas of science experts are translated into policy.
“The aim of Wave Three of science studies is to preserve
the idea of expertise as specialist knowledge and to find a better way of
analysing and managing the trade-offs between expert authority and democratic
accountability.”
The authors’ idea of elective
modernism seems to have to do with choosing the experts over the non-experts, even though the experts will sometimes be wrong.
“It remains the case even though we know that there will
be occasions when the conclusions of the person who has observed will turn out
to be less accurate than the view of the person who has not observed – the
person with the tea leaves. In spite of that possibility, the elective
modernist prefers the view of the person who has observed. And “the elective
modernist proper has to cleave to that preference without justifying it by
reference to the successfulness of observation over other methods of knowing.” Not
only is this the way of elective modernism, but it is also more robust than
relying on success as a criterion: for all the reasons given for why
observation is flawed and unreliable, there will be instances when observation
turns out not to be more successful than other methods; but in these
circumstances, elective modernism will be unaffected.”
They
use the examples of corroboration and falsification to promote their idea of
elective modernism. While corroboration has been maligned by scientists showing
that simply replicating the same experiment does not prove something if the
experiment itself is somehow flawed, they note that replication is still a very
good means in science to validate. Falsification is also not perfect, as it
sometimes can be circumvented, as Karl Popper’s student showed. Popper was the
originator of falsificationism. However, corroboration and falsification remain
the best ways to verify scientific results.
Insights from New Scientist
New Scientist published a very
short article a few months ago that illustrates that there are other methods of
knowing aside from science that are sometimes just as valid. They give an
example of the philosophical implications of quantum physics. As Sagan and
others noted, there are many questions that science cannot currently answer.
Some can be approached by other means, such as philosophical inquiry. A few
years back, I read Stephen Hawking’s last book, ‘Brief Answers to the Big
Questions,’ in which he opined about those difficult-to-answer questions. He
put forth some really interesting ideas, but did not really answer those
questions to my satisfaction. This simply illustrates that science can’t answer
everything. The article notes:
“But in allowing philosophy into the lab, we must not
let it be accompanied by dogma or muscle out evidence and the scientific
method. A recent case that perhaps went too far is the idea that trees share
resources via a "wood wide web". As ecologist Suzanne Simard
explains, the backlash to her promoting this idea came from people feeling she
had overreached on what the science can say.”
“The lesson, though, is not to dismiss philosophy – as
the calculating quantum physicists did – but instead to see it as another tool
in the scientific toolbox. Science doesn't have a monopoly on good ideas, and
as long as it can be justified in evidence, knowledge from other disciplines
should be welcomed.”
My Conclusion
I believe that science and
democracy are two of the most important human endeavors. Science is the best
means we have of knowing things, and democracy is the best means we have of
creating just societies. Both were created by humans, and neither is perfect.
In terms of secularist belief, one could say that I believe in science and
democracy. I think that they are two of humanity’s greatest achievements.
References:
Carl
Sagan on Humility, Science as a Tool of Democracy, and the Value of Uncertainty.
Maria Popova. The Marginalian. November 9, 2015. Carl Sagan on Humility, Science as a
Tool of Democracy, and the Value of Uncertainty – The Marginalian
Humanizing
Science and Philosophy of Science: George Sarton, Contextualist Philosophies of
Science, and the Indigenous/Science Project. Alison Wylie. Published online by
Cambridge University Press, Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 20 October 2022. Humanizing Science and Philosophy of
Science: George Sarton, Contextualist Philosophies of Science, and the
Indigenous/Science Project | Canadian Journal of Philosophy | Cambridge Core
Introduction:
Science and Democracy, Introduction of the book, ‘Democratizing Science.’
Paola Mattei. September
2023. Introduction_Science_and_Democracy.pdf
Why
Democracies Need Science. Harry Collins and Robert Evans. Polity Press. 2017. Why
Democracies Need Science
Science
doesn’t have a monopoly on good ideas. New Scientist, May 2026. Science
doesn't have a monopoly on good ideas
