The Atlantic Council’s Energy Sanction Dashboard Provides Data, Analysis, History, and Implications of Energy Sanctions

      I have previously posted on this blog some of Bloomberg’s very good analysis of the shadow fleet oil and LNG trade of sanctioned oil & gas, and who is buying it. The Atlantic Council also has a great tool for exploring energy sanctions, focusing specifically on Russian, Iranian, and Venezuelan oil.

     The use of less detectable shadow fleets with deliberately opaque ownership and ship-to-ship transfers of oil to unsanctioned tankers has aided the shadow system to thrive. They note that the sanctioned shadow fleets and transshipment networks allowed China to save up to $28.8 million per day on imports at peak discount levels.

“US sanctions waivers, rising oil prices, and supply shortages following the conflict in Iran have boosted demand for Russian crude. Since the waivers were issued, Russia has supplied approximately 300 million barrels to the international market as of May 11, with India re-emerging as a major importer and Southeast Asia emerging as a new destination for Russian crude.”

“The Atlantic Council’s Energy Sanctions Dashboard, created by the Economic Statecraft Initiative and Global Energy Center,

1) assesses how sanctions have impacted global crude oil flows,

2) explores the unintended consequences for the global crude oil industry, and

3) analyzes lessons learned about the deployment of energy sanctions for achieving foreign policy objectives.”

     The currently unresolved, but hopefully soon-to-be resolved Strait of Hormuz disruption is considered to be the biggest energy market disruption in history, with Asia being the most affected region, followed by Europe.

     They note that after Lukoil and Rosneft were sanctioned in October 2025, China briefly stopped importing oil from Russia but resumed imports by shifting the destinations to smaller refiners, less exposed to sanctions enforcement actions. China was also able to import sanctioned Venezuelan oil at a nice discount in 2025. China also buys most of the sanctioned Iranian oil, including oil with unknown buyers, which are thought to be mostly Chinese buyers. In 2025, the discounts meant that sanctioned oil was selling at 10-15$ per barrel cheaper than non-sanctioned oil. However, since the Iran War broke out, Russia has been able to sell oil at $10 higher than the elevated Brent prices, giving Putin’s war machine a needed lifeline, unfortunately.

     The Atlantic Council does call for stricter sanctions enforcement. We saw some of that in late 2025 and early 2026 with the seizing of some tankers, but with temporary sanctions waivers, enforcement has dropped.

     It turns out China was wise to stockpile oil in 2025, which makes it less affected by the Iran situation. It is unfortunate, but other Southeast Asian countries, such as India and Indonesia, have made deals to import Russian oil under the sanctions waivers, but the Atlantic Council sees it also as diversifying their supply from the Middle East, and this may continue after the sanctions waivers are ended. It will take some time for the oil markets to get supply back up to pre-war levels. Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Sri Lanka have also negotiated with Russia for some of that waiver oil. China has responded to U.S. efforts for:

“…secondary sanctions to target shadow fleets, foreign refiners, maritime and financial intermediaries, and overseas commercial and banking infrastructure, including intermediaries in China, the United Arab Emirates, Hong Kong, Iraq, and Oman. In response, China ordered its companies not to comply with US sanctions against Chinese refineries, deploying its “prohibition order” for the first time. The move marks a shift in Beijing’s response to US sanctions, from one where China would have rhetorically condemned US trade restrictions while allowing companies to comply, to a more confrontational approach.”

     The Atlantic Council recommends two important ways to tackle the long-established sanctions evasion networks, which they call the “Axis of Evasion.”

“To preserve energy sanctions as an effective tool of economic statecraft against Russia and Iran, the United States should focus on targeting two central elements of sanctions evasion networks: shadow fleet tankers and Chinese “teapot” refineries. These elements have facilitated Russia-Iran-China oil trade for years and were notably analyzed by Kimberly Donovan and Maia Nikoladze in their March 2024 “Axis of Evasion” article” 

 

 

References:

 

Energy Sanctions Dashboard: How the Iran Conflict is Reshaping Sanctioned Crude Oil Flows. The Atlantic Council. May 21, 2026. Energy Sanctions Dashboard - Atlantic Council