Monday, February 27, 2023

Grid-Scale Battery Storage: Cost Issues and Deployment Projections

 

     The DOE’s Berkeley Labs reported in a study of the grid interconnection queue for 2021 that 98% of U.S. energy storage projects in the queue are battery storage projects. Grid-scale battery storage typically provides short-duration storage of 4-6 hours for renewables resources. Those batteries are charged when renewables generation is high and discharged to the grid when renewables generation is low to help balance the grid.

     Globally, China followed closely by South Korea, are leading the charge for grid-scale battery storage. In 2023 China is expected to install about 27% (9.8GW) of global grid-scale battery storage while South Korea will install about 18.5% (6.8GW). Those two countries together make up over 45% of grid-scale battery storage. The U.S. will be third at 14.4% (5.3GW), followed closely by Germany at 13% (4.8GW). Total global grid-scale battery deployment in 2023 is expected to be 36.7GW.

     In the U.S. pumped storage hydroelectric makes up 90% of energy storage. Some of those facilities have been in operation for decades, although they typically have low utilization factors which erodes their economic competitiveness. On a cost per kW basis pumped storage is cheaper than batteries but less flexible in operation and location. Permitting and construction of a pumped storage facility can take 3-5 years each and face opposition. They can also provide much longer-term storage from 10 hours or longer. These are very large construction projects that can have significant environmental impact. Financers face risks. Batteries can be deployed much faster and in smaller projects and in the places where they are needed. A good question is whether battery storage will provide adequate and cost-effective solutions to backing up and integrating wind and solar generation.

     According to Bloomberg New Energy Finance the price of battery storage has dropped significantly, from $1,200 per kilowatt-hour (kWh) of lithium-ion battery storage in 2010 to $151/kWh in 2022. The IEA’s net zero by 2050 pathway has global capacity growing from 18GW in 2020 to 610GW in 2030 and to 3,100GW in 2050. If that is to happen that global capacity must grow by a whopping 16.6 times from 2023-2030, a mere 7 years. That would be a major increase in its growth rate by a factor of about 4. With high metals and lithium prices and supply chain issues, that is a major longshot and again shows the aspirational nature of groups like the IEA and net-zero by 2050 advocates. The price of lithium remains 5 times what it was in 2020 and higher raw materials prices have caused cost/kWh to rise 7% in 2022 for lithium batteries. It was the first time that lithium batteries prices rose after a continuous drop in prices over the years. The following graph shows how far off two more sober projections are from the IEA net-zero pathway:


     The GlobalData forecast seems the most likely to me by far, especially with the cost and supply chain challenges. An industry already experiencing such constraints will no doubt experience them more if the growth rate quadruples in less than seven years. If the GlobalData forecast comes to pass, then deployments will have to grow by 10 times over 20 years from 2030 to 2050 to meet the IEA’s net-zero goal. Once again, we see that the IEA’s decarbonization pathway projections are heavily front-end loaded so as not be reasonable in the near-term. Even the GlobalData forecast shows a quite large growth rate from 2028-2030 that may be difficult to meet so the reality could be lower than that. At current growth rates the amount of deployed global grid-scale battery storage by 2030 would be at about 275GW rather than GlobalData’s estimate of 354GW or Bloomberg NEF’s estimate of 411 GW.

 



Cumulative Global Grid-Scale Battery Storage Beginning in 2017 with Forecast Through 2023 (GW). Dat Source: GlobalData.


References:

Weekly data: Booming battery pipeline heralds era of renewables-dominated grids. Nick Ferris. Energy Monitor. February 27, 2023. Booming battery storage pipeline heralds renewables era (energymonitor.ai)

Queued Up: Characteristics of Power Plants Seeking Transmission Interconnection as of the End of 2021. DOE. Office of Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy. PowerPoint Presentation (lbl.gov)

Pumped Storage Hydropower Capabilities and Costs. Pumped Storage Hydropower Intyernational Forum. September 2021. 61432796645661f940f277a8_IFPSH - PSH Capabilities and Costs_15 Sept.pdf (website-files.com)




Sunday, February 26, 2023

The U.S. Power Grid’s Interconnection Process is a Gauntlet That Slows Down Wind, Solar, and Battery Projects: Transmission, Grid Integration Capabilities, Permitting, Supply Chains, and Oppositions are the Reasons Why

 

     The interconnection queue refers to the phase of an energy project from when the interconnection request is made to the power operator to the granting of an interconnection agreement. It is a proxy for the time it takes to begin construction of a project from when a request is made. But the vast majority don’t get built. The New York Times reports that now solar, wind, and battery projects are taking on average more than 3 years to get through interconnection queues and a whopping 80% of projects do not make it at all. It takes an average of a little over 4 years to get to commercial operation from interconnection request. In California’s CAISO it takes 5 years. Even though these projects can generally be built quickly and on budget, the time it takes to get them running is quite slow. Just a decade ago that length of time used to be two years, so it has doubled. Supply chain issues, permitting slowdowns, public opposition, and lack of adequate transmission or grid integration capabilities are the problems. The high number of projects that are withdrawn is actually nothing new. DOE data from Berkeley Labs shows that since 2000 the average number of projects withdrawn amounts to about 77% of all projects initiated. What is new is the increasing number of projects initiated, corresponding increase in the total capacity of new proposed projects, and the time it takes to get approval for those that are approved. About 90% of the proposed projects are solar, wind, and storage projects.

     Intermittent wind and solar in particular are likely to disrupt local power grids and make it harder to balance them. Power engineers must study them to figure out how to integrate them and what grid upgrades are needed. There are not enough power engineers to study the myriad projects in a timely manner. System operator PJM hopes to speed up the queuing process by bundling projects. PJM also announced a freeze on new applications until 2026 so they can catch up. They currently have 2700 projects under study. The workflow from interconnection request begins with feasibility, then system impact, then facilities. At any point in this process the request may be withdrawn or the system operator or other regional authority may offer an interconnection agreement so the project can be built. If transmission upgrades or other upgrades are deemed to be required, the developer will often be asked to pay the costs which leads to lots of withdrawals. Since about 2016 the average time it takes from getting an interconnection agreement to commercial energy generation is a little over 2 years.  

     At the end of 2021 more than 8100 projects were awaiting approval, up from 5600 at the end of 2020. Wind, solar, and battery projects fell 16% in 2022, partially due to queue problems. One renewables developer called it the number one project killer. As time goes by higher materials costs, which has been the trend in the past couple of years, can make new projects unviable. Queue holdups are causing major headaches for renewables developers.

     One of the biggest problems is simply that there is not enough grid and transmission capacity available and the costs to upgrade sink the projects. Developers may estimate costs, including grid upgrades, and then find out after review that those costs will be much higher than they predicted. The grid system operators sometimes must shift their costs when projects are withdrawn when evaluating subsequent projects on the same local grid. To complicate matters some developers will submit multiple projects hoping to piggyback off of projects by other developers who pay for grid upgrades. They only intend to build some of those projects at all if someone else does the upgrades. Apparently, this kind of speculative bidding is happening more and more. Rob Gramlich, president of the consulting group Grid Strategies, suggested that these perverse incentives are a consequence of a process that is too chaotic and not fair to all. It certainly seems inefficient. He thinks the grid operators should come up with upgrades that would be broadly beneficial and spread the costs over more developers and users. This approach has been successful in developing transmission for growing wind development in Texas and in the Midcontinent. The biggest problem isn’t engineering but who pays, said a MISO system planner.

     Data indicate that state incentives and mandates also contribute to the problem. In some places they have resulted in large increases in proposed small-scale solar projects that may be harder to sort out in terms of grid integration. Indeed, looking at the Berkeley Labs data, one can see that solar projects are the most numerous. In 2021, the number of proposed storage projects exceeded the number of proposed wind projects for the first time. I am guessing storage projects are easier to integrate in general since they can alter charging and discharging times to a certain extent. The whole mess does not bode well for a renewables revolution or for fast decarbonization scenarios. There has also been an increase of hybrid projects: solar-plus-storage and wind-plus storage. The Berkeley Labs study concludes:

 

“Solar (676 GW) accounts for >65% of all active generator capacity in the queues, though substantial wind (247 GW) and gas (75GW) capacity is also in development. Over 77 GW of offshore wind is currently active in the queues.”  

 

“Considerable standalone (213 GW) and hybrid (~208 GW1) battery capacity is in development, along with 7 GW of other storage.”

 

If that capacity is weighted to actual production potential by multiply by avg. capacity factors, then we get 168GW for solar, 97GW for wind, and 43GW for gas, or 54% solar, 31% wind, and 14% gas, excluding storage. The 14% represented by gas is the easiest to integrate, followed by the 31% for wind. The majority, the 54% represented by solar is the most difficult and costly to integrate. Thus, the majority of projects and potential generation is the least simple and most expensive to integrate.  

     The graph below shows the growth of proposed hybrid projects, the growth in proposed standalone storage overtaking proposed wind in 2021, and modest drops since about 2017 of proposed gas projects. It should be noted that some of those gas projects and others to be proposed will be required to backup and integrate renewables, though less so with the growth of storage, if it grows as expected.



 

Graph from the Berkeley Labs study showing capacity of different generation sources in the queue.



Graph from the Berkeley Labs study showing completion percentages by region.

 

 

     Looking at the graph below I am surprised by the amount of solar in the PJM regions considering that the region is not ideal for solar energy production. The Southeast and SPP regions have much better solar potential than PJM. However, it appears that the SPP region has only about a one fourth of the amount of solar in the queue in recent years than PJM and the Southeast has only about one third as such solar as PJM. It doesn’t seem to make sense that so much solar is being proposed in a region where solar will be less profitable due to lower capacity factors. Perhaps it is partially due to more power needs in the region due to population. PJM generally has quite a bit of reserve capacity now but that is expected to change as more thermal resources retire. Other regions with better solar and wind resources tend to be in less populated areas in the U.S. requiring more large and expensive transmission projects, unfortunately. PJM just reported that they expect 40GW of generating capacity, 90% of it from coal and gas, to retire by 2030, or 21% of the region’s total capacity. That could account for some of the uptick in solar and storage proposals. However, in the same report they noted just 15-30GW in new capacity is expected by 2030. If that is true it will eat into their reserve capacity. MISO region is facing a similar issue and the North American Electric Reliability Corporation is warning that planned retirements may have to be scaled back if reliability is to be maintained. Transmission and other grid upgrades really have to precede any new surges of renewable power. They warn that the pushes to replace fossil fuel and nuclear power could result in energy shortfalls and rolling outages in extreme weather events as we have already seen, only perhaps worse. Goals and mandates, like Biden’s goal of 100% carbon free electricity by 2035, just a little over a decade away, make reliability problems more likely, they argue.  

 


Graph from the Berkeley Labs study generation sources in the queue by region.

 

 References:

The U.S. Has Billions for Wind and Solar Projects. Good Luck Plugging Them In. Brad Plumer. New York Times. February 23, 2023. The U.S. Has Billions for Wind and Solar Projects. Good Luck Plugging Them In. (yahoo.com)

Queued Up: Characteristics of Power Plants Seeking Transmission Interconnection as of the End of 2021. DOE. Office of Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy. PowerPoint Presentation (lbl.gov)

Largest U.S. grid operator warns of coming power capacity shortfalls. Seeking Alpha. February 25. 2023. Largest U.S. grid operator warns of coming power capacity shortfalls (msn.com)


Wednesday, February 22, 2023

A Short History of Geosteering – by Kent C. Stewart, Geologist, Blue Dragon Geoscience, LLC (originally written March 2016, revised Feb. 2023)

 

     My first experience with a horizontal well was in a gas storage field in 1996 where I was a mud logger. This was a well in the Oriskany Sandstone near Charleston, West Virginia. The targeted part of the porous sandstone was clean, well-rounded, well-sorted, and fairly unconsolidated. We got to take samples from a shale shaker, which was rare in those days in Appalachia. Drilling was very slow when we got horizontal, so we took samples every two feet. We were especially making note of a glauconitic zone of characteristic green color. We correlated this zone to a soft spot of high ROP just above the main porosity zone. We were helping to steer the well by noting the recurring presence of this zone and the clean sand below it. However, after a few days of this very slow drilling we saw no glauconite and no clean sand but a more consolidated finer grained sand. We were out of the porosity zone. Apparently, the main geologist who had come from Texas had miscalculated the dip. Because of this the project was scrapped since at the time short-radius horizontal drilling was less flexible in changing inclinations. The goal of the project was to increase deliverability from the storage field in times of high winter demand. They sought deliverability from these horizontal wells of up to 50MMFC per day. Horizontal wells can especially increase deliverability late in the storage draw season when volumes and pressure in the storage reservoir are lower. This well did not succeed due to inadequate steering but others in the field did. Other advantages of horizontal wells in gas storage fields include the ability to develop less favorable parts of the reservoir, reduce the level of base gas required to pressure the working gas, allow fewer surface sites, and allow less pipe and surface equipment.

     In the late 1980’s the Cretaceous Austin Chalk was a big play in Texas and Louisiana. Vertical drilling made occasional good wells but there were also many dry holes. Lateral drilling through the reservoir was quite successful in some fields but less so in others. It was thought that lateral wells could better connect with the natural fracture networks which had a strong vertical component. Eventually these wells came to be often steered with gamma ray in the new technique of logging-while-drilling (LWD), or measurement-while drilling (MWD). Incidentally, the source of Austin Chalk oil is now thought to be the prolific Eagle Ford Shale below it, although it was once thought to be self-sourced. Some of the horizontal gas wells in the deeper Austin Chalk trend in Texas had phenomenal production, some exceeding 50MMCF per day in line. During this time period the first company devoted to geosteering as a specialty, Horizontal Solutions International (HSI), came about in the mid-1990’s.

     Horizontal drilling of coal bed methane wells became common in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s. CBM wells in the Appalachian Basin were drilled on air, mainly in order to de-gas the coals before mining the same seams. Drilling was very fast as coals are quite soft relative to the rock around them. This contrast is an advantage to geosteering as the bit tends to stay in the soft rock and deflect off of the hard rock. Even so, properly orienting the motor was still important to staying in the coal. In coal, in the absence of MWD gamma one can steer on the basis of ROP. Samples can also help and with coal. Even looking at the color of what is coming out of the flow line can verify if the bit is in the coal or not. I once made an ROP log of a well drilling vertically through a coal seam by watching the drill string come down past the equally spaced horizontal metal on the drilling mast and counting how long it took. I was also running a gas detector, so I wanted to correlate gas to depth since there was no geolograph on that rig to correlate ROP with depth. When we ran e-logs on the well the match was very good to my makeshift ROP log. Later, we drilled some horizontal wells in these coal seams in Southern West Virginia. I was able to work for a short time on-site at one of these wells in 2001 learning a bit of geosteering by using Excel worksheets of survey data and calculating dips. The main issue when the bit exited the coal bed was simply to determine whether it was above or below it. That is often a main issue in geosteering today as well. If there was a contrast in rock above and below that was certainly preferred to a transition into similar rock character in terms of ROP, gamma, and samples.

     Beginning in late 2005 the company I was working for decided to try a Devonian Lower Huron Shale well in Southern Ohio drilled with stiff foam, which proved to be a mistake. Vibrations affected the tools which could not get good reliable survey and gamma readings. We sent the data to a geosteering specialist via email who then sent back an interpretation. This continued as we drilled horizontal wells in the Marcellus Shale beginning in 2006. I would correlate and steer with paper logs. After a certain amount of time, I was able to rather routinely contradict some of the interpretations of our specialist. I then devised a way to present the data graphically. It was fairly accurate but tedious and slow. Soon thereafter the company acquired licenses for Stoner Engineering geosteering software (SES). I was now able to utilize it for faster correlations and perhaps more importantly in the structurally complex Marcellus, to test several different correlation scenarios quickly and determine the correct one. We no longer needed our specialist.

     By the late 2000’s geosteering had become well established in the shale plays and the structural, depositional, and petrophysical variations of each play were becoming apparent. With better well control the regional and local dips were getting a little more predictable but in some plays like the Niobrara, Woodford, Marcellus, and others, small faults undetectable by seismic resolution had to be interpreted by the geosteerer, typically after a significant amount of section had been drilled past the fault. In addition, since the survey and gamma were typically close to 50 ft. behind the bit this means that by the time the post-fault correlation could be determined a significant amount of hole was necessarily drilled out of zone before adjustments could be made. In some cases, it was worse in the Marcellus as high dips, sometimes very high dips up to 45 degrees, could be encountered near reverse faults, or high-angle thrusts. These zones were typically avoided but sometimes they were not seen on old 2D seismic and sometimes the curve was drilled in the fault zone to try and maximize lateral well length between the large fault zones. This made geosteering quite challenging at times as unexpected dip changes and folds were not uncommon. Some plays and areas of plays are relatively calm geologically. In those areas it is of course easier to maximize in-target footage even in small target windows.

     By 2007 around 400 rigs were drilling horizontally in multiple shale plays: mainly the Barnett, the Bakken, the Bossier and Haynesville, the Fayetteville, the Woodford, and the Marcellus. The Niobrara, Eagle Ford, Mississippi Lime, SCOOP, STACK, Tuscaloosa Marine Shale, Utica-Point Pleasant, Burket, and multiple Permian plays would come later. Dr. Mike Stoner, the creator of SES software defined some of the terms and parameters of “technical geosteering.” One is the idea of Relative Stratigraphic Depth (RSD) which he defined as “stratigraphic distance relative to an “arbitrary” reference point [or marker bed]” This software and others can stretch or squeeze a gamma or other MWD log section to match a control well TVD log and/or the adjusted TVD log just landed in the well being drilled. No software can be perfect as it difficult to account for changes in stratigraphic thickness of different zones over the length of a lateral, for deflection off hard zones which can temporarily distort the inclination and make it appear that the dip has changed, and differences in gamma character due to inadequate sampling rates as a result of very fast drilling. A good geosteerer can see through these issues and adjust accordingly, thus optimizing the effectiveness of the software.

     By around 2010 geosteering had taken four main forms. 1) Dedicated geosteering centers were established where geologists typically work 12-hour shifts, sometimes on multiple wells. The expense of the software made this economic as software license keys could be optimized. 2) There was on-site geosteering, sometimes combined with mudlogging. As access to software increased and geosteering was in demand more geologists were learning geosteering, some while learning mudlogging. This was probably not wise at the time as that is lot to manage for a young geologist, although there are likely some outfits that with experience do fairly well at it now. Some plays may be better geosteered on-site. One is perhaps the Bakken as I have heard but I have no experience with it. Plays where gamma is less distinct and where ROP and samples are more definitive, are probably good candidates for on-site geosteering. 3) Remote, or off-site geosteering has also been a successful format. The advantages to remote geosteering include avoiding travel expenses and travel times, avoiding another body on location, and avoiding the distractions of the rig environment. With WITSML well information systems such as Pason, all of the important parameters of the well can be monitored in real-time from anywhere. Phone apps make these portals quite portable as well. 4) In-House geosteering has some advantages if the geologist is involved in updating structure maps, isopach maps, in well-planning, or needs a second opinion from another geologist who may be present.  Due to the necessity of 24-hour coverage in-house steering may also require a remote geosteering component for off-hours. Sometimes in-house geologists will follow along geosteering along with field or remote geosteerers for duplicate coverage and cross-checking, which is not a bad idea, especially in structurally complex plays.

     Other potential innovations involve utilizing resistivity logs where gamma ray is indistinct or has very little variable character. This can be important in some play, mainly carbonates. It has been noted that in the Utica-Point Pleasant shale play in Ohio that imprecise steering may lead to less optimization of preferred target section as well as missing the structure along the well path which may affect well production. Another technique of chemostratigraphy – correlating geochemically by powdering samples to determine elemental constituents by XRD/XRF (X-Ray diffraction and X-ray fluorescence). While this is potentially useful in some circumstances it is also slow and not very amenable to being useful at current ROPs. The technique itself is quite useful and probably has better application to compare wells after they are drilled. Another method is detailed Mass Spectrometry to tag specific mud gas signatures to specific zones. Yet another technique that may have niche applications in complex trapped conventional reservoirs, offshore reservoirs, and faulted unconventional reservoirs is seismic-while-drilling (SWD). The main goal of SWD is to image what is ahead of the bit. Schlumberger has used the technique quite a bit but not much is known about its success rate. I had heard years ago of the idea of using resisitivity to see ahead of the bit when attached to a BHA close to the bit. If I recall correctly it was because it penetrates deeper than other logs and can be pointed ahead of the bit. Another new technique I just read about is Baker's VisiTrak which utilizes "extra deep reading azimuthal resistivity..," in combination with omnidirectional sensors (360deg) that can image bed boundaries up to 100ft ahead of the bit. The sensors are very close to the bit attached to the BHA with a rotary steerable motor.

     All geosteerers make correlation mistakes. The likelihood of making a mistake can be influenced by several factors: gamma quality, look-alike zones, unexpected large dip changes, a different expectation of geology, and most commonly – similar gamma character above and below a known well-correlated zone. More well control leads to refined structure maps and thus better predictability of regional dip. Pad wells drilled parallel are typically easiest to steer but can have some variability. Some of that variability has to do with whether the wells are drilled perpendicular, oblique, or parallel with regional dip, as well as changes in structure. Distance from the control well is important as thickness changes relative to that well can be quite significant. This is more common in the curve which traverses far more stratigraphic distance than a target window. It can also be a factor in the target interval but there is usually not more than a foot or two variation. Even so, this can be a factor when drilling a small target window in areas of depositional thinning on marine shelves. Sometimes deflections off of hard zones or depositional variations can look like small faults or sometimes they may actually be small faults. Thus, I think it is difficult to determine for sure if offsets less than about 3-4 feet or so are actual faults or false faults. If a similar offset is encountered near the same VS in one or more parallel well(s) then it is more likely a fault. In such cases the actual orientation (azimuth) of the fault can be determined. If a large gas show is encountered without changing zones and without changes in mud properties (weight, viscosity, water loss, cuttings size and shape) then it is possible that a significant gas-filled fracture was encountered.

     There are also psychological and communication issues in geosteering. Since the process of geosteering involves frequent interpretation of data in constantly changing conditions that may require adjustments there are times when correlations are uncertain and tentative. Communicating degree of certainty is important. Considering reliability of regional dip is important as well. From my experience it is best to have frequent contact with the directional drillers, MWD personnel, and sometimes the Drilling Engineer, and occasionally the mudloggers for sample and gas verifications, either in person, by phone, or through email. Email is usually fine but if drilling out-of-zone seems possible then a phone call or two can be warranted. Some directional drillers have particular styles of drilling and don’t like to change inclination. Doglegs need to be considered. Tolerances and protocols for changing inclination and by how much need to be discussed. Structurally complex areas can make such required communication more frequent than one might like but sometimes that is the nature of the beast.

     Geosteering results can be used to determine the amount of what I call primary reservoir access (PRA), which is access to the most desirable reservoir rock. If that rock is “hot” shale, then footage and percentage of the wellbore in the hot shale can be calculated. In some source-rock mudstone reservoirs there are thin beds of varying gamma and interbedded limestones even in small target intervals. In such cases one may determine what I call – relative optimized reservoir access (RORA)– which is basically how much of the wellbore is in the best part of the target interval. Primary reservoir access (PRA) can be compared to the microseismic delineation of stimulated reservoir volume (SRV). With microseismic studies thin stratigraphic intervals defined by geosteering correlations can be compared in terms of induced fracture propagation, tendency for frac height growth, and frac half-length. Target intervals can be tweaked or optimized on the basis of such studies.

     Perhaps the most desirable setup for geosteering, though exceedingly rare, would include gamma ray and resistivity logs, both very close to the bit with a rotary steerable to keep the well from moving up and down too much through the formation. Plays with faults and/or high dips are most amenable to having gamma MWD and surveys close to the bit in order to minimize out-of-target drilling. SES software has improved over the years and now incorporates a nice cross-section feature that accommodates mud logs, ROP logs, and other data. It can also accept the grid data that makes up structure maps and seismic sections. Newer geosteering programs like ROGII’s StarSteer can accommodate seismic lines, image logs, and other nice graphical features.

 

     Another current issue with the ubiquity of multi-pad wells is wells with large turnouts for proper spacing. This can create some distortions during drilling of the curve, but they are typically quite manageable. A related issue is the need the change azimuth to keep required spacing from an unleased property. Yet another is to avoid so-called “no tag zones” near lease lines. This is an issue in Pennsylvania where the base of the Marcellus target zone may be a mere two feet from a no-tag zone (Onondaga Limestone) although the true rationale for this rule is impractical and potentially unfairly punitive to an oil and gas operator, especially if an unexpected fault, dip, or inclination would occur.

     Horizontal and directional wells requiring some degree of geosteering are also utilized in deep geothermal drilling, where MWD tools and mud motors need to be able to endure high temperatures for long periods. The deep, high temperature/high pressure Haynesville Shale and Bossier plays and other oil and gas plays also require HPHT tools. When I geosteered Haynesville wells we kept a temperature log on our reports showing the formation often at around 300 deg F. Geosteering may also be required in carbon sequestration wells where horizontal wells increase both the CO2 injectivity and the CO2 storage capacity of deep brine reservoirs. In newer closed-loop geothermal, two wells may be geosteered in order to be connected. Typically, they are geosteered and when they get close, they are steered to connection with magnetic ranging technology, which is more precise with closer targets. Injection wells drilled for hot oil treatment in the Canadian oil sands also utilize geosteering. Some oil and gas wells employ multi-laterals where new laterals are sidetracked off of previous laterals usually to drill a different zone. Horizontal drilling for near-surface pipeline and utility road and stream crossings generally don’t require geosteering, although soil horizons and rock bed dips and boundaries should be known and documented.

     Recently, as the oil & and gas industry has been contracted on and off due to low commodity prices and increased efficiency, the need for day-rate field and operations people has been reduced. This has created an overhang of qualified field people that will likely stick around to some extent even as prices recover. Thus, there is now much competition in terms of people and price. Success rates driven by experience and effective workflows are very important in tight margins.

     Since I wrote this short history there have been a few new developments in geosteering. Some MWD companies provide continuous inclination data which may give suggestions whether the bit is deflecting from a hard zone which can give a slightly erroneous inclination. They may also provide gamma-up and gamma-down curves which can indicate whether one is above or below a zone. I have found these to be effective maybe 60% of the time. The problem with them is that there may be thin beds of higher or lower gamma that only show up if the well path is very close to dip, In any case, they are quite useful when there is uncertainty. Many wells are now drilled with rotary steerable motors with survey and MWD data closer to the bit so less delay means less out-of-target footage. Drilling is consistently fast in most formations.

     There are different methods of geosteering that may be more or less suitable for different plays or regions of plays. In plays or regions of plays where stratigraphy is flat or where dip is has little variability, it may be better to steer by waypoints or by calculating a spread of the stratigraphic target from a previously defined drilling target and then adjusting when the spread gets to a certain magnitude. This works where there is little change in dip. It has worked for me in the Haynesville play where a single correlation dip line may last for 500 to 1500ft. However, in plays like the Marcellus, the dip often changes in addition to changes in target interval thickness or thickness relative to type wells so that there are often several apparent dip changes within a hundred feet. In that case, we always recommend an average dip to maintain. Sometimes when drastic dip changes are expected it is wise to anticipate them by moving to one end of the target window or even out of the target window to avoid going out the other end when the dip changes in the case of the largest dip changes. Frequency of reporting depends a lot on the expected geology and may change within the well dependent on dip changes and/or faulting. 

     ROGII’s Star Steer has taken quite a bit of the geosteering software market share. It is a good program that is easy to use, fast to set up and adapt, and has quite a few interesting features and “bells and whistles.”  Some companies now also set up geosteering reports on the cloud with automatic downloading of WITSML data straight from the rig. This saves time and gets correlations up faster. It also allows the geosteerer to focus more on correlation and less on typing, copy-pasting, and emailing. Wells today are drilled quite fast and turnaround time can be important. 

     Better than gamma up and gamma down in my opinion is the multitrack azimuthal gamma ray log curve which is presented as an image log to interpret whether the bit is moving up section or down section. A dynamic image gamma ray can also be generated to see if an interpretation best matches the azimuthal gamma. I have been learning the value of this log in delineating gamma lobes that look alike in the Austin Chalk of South Texas.

 


 Example of a Marcellus Well with Folding Steered with Rogii's StarSteer


References:

Geosteering Keeps Drillers on the Right Track – by Louise S. Durham, in A.A.P.G. Explorer, Dec. 2012

Technical Geosteering Finds the Sweet Spot – by Dr. Mike Stoner, in E & P Magazine, November 2007, pgs. 71-77

Carbon Dioxide Injectivity in Brine Reservoirs Using Horizontal Wells – multiple authors, National Energy Technology Lab – U.S DOE

ENEL’s Experience With Directional Geothermal Wells – by Bianchi, Quintavalle, and Rossi (Italy)

Horizontal Drilling Used in Gas Storage Programs – by Young, McDonald, and Shikari (Gas Research Institute), in Oil & Gas Journal, April, 5, 1993.

Geosteering as Research – by Louise S. Durham, in A.A.P.G. Explorer, Dec. 2013

Seismic While Drilling Moves Closer to Reality – by David Brown, in A.A.P.G. Explorer, Dec. 2013

VisiTrak Services May Eliminate Need for Pilot Wells in Wellbore Placement - by Alex Endress, in Drilling Contractor, drillingcontractor.org, 2016.

Guide to Geosteering Series - Parts 1,2,3, and 4 - by Patrick Tobin, posted in OilPro, Feb., 2016

Tuesday, February 21, 2023

Flowback and Produced Water from Hydraulic Fracturing Disrupts Small Organisms After Acute 48-Hour Exposure, Presumably from Spills or Open Pits That Remain Open: Not Unexpected

 

     As reported by Inside Climate News, referencing a paper in Environmental Science & Technology, fracking flowback and produced water (FPW) can affect small organisms, causing increased mortality and lingering effects for weeks afterward. This is, of course, not unexpected, and probably not a big deal overall, with the exception of spills. We have long known FPW can be detrimental to plant and animal life, especially the high salinity produced water component that comes from the formations underground. The flowback water at first mostly consists of the “makeup water” which refers to the freshwater with added components like surfactants, scale inhibitors, corrosion inhibitors, biocides mainly for bacteria, gelling components, and a few other chemical additives, all at very low concentrations. The makeup water is typically much more environmentally benign than the produced water. The researchers obtained a sample of FPW from a Montney Shale well in Alberta, Canada and did their study.

     The Inside Climate News article noted significant amounts of spills reported up to 2012 or 2014 but did not note that the number of spills today is much smaller for two reasons: better management of FPW and less wells so less overall FPW, even though wells are longer now which offsets the lesser amount of water somewhat. Better FPW management includes better spill prevention and containment. They also noted from another report that water from 113 of those spills entered freshwater lakes and streams, where they were obviously further diluted by great magnitudes.

     The study in Environmental Science and Technology did note that significant mortality after 19 days, close to 70%, of water fleas (genus Daphnia) occurred in the concentrated water, and about 50% in the less concentrated water that simulated downstream exposure. While I don’t know the lifespans of these creatures, I can guess that they die of other reasons as well. Salt in the water was likely the most toxic component, although they noted that surfactants in the water caused some of the water fleas to get stuck on the water, unable to move and to dry out until they died. The researchers also noted that toxicity of FWP varies from well to well but the well they used was on the more toxic side. Thus, it may overestimate the toxicity of the FPW of an average well.

     Inside Climate News notes that California uses FWP for irrigation. I’m pretty sure this is post-treatment water, which does not resemble untreated water. After all, it has also been approved by California regulators, among the strictest regulators in the U.S. It is also used as a dust suppressant on roads in some states and as road salt in some states. We do know that that use has effects on some waterways. Normal road salt has negatively affected bodies of water in northern states like Minnesota. High concentrations of salt are toxic to plant and animal life and can render some lakes and streams less amenable to life. They and the leaders of the study complained that oil and gas companies are not transparent enough with their wastewater components and toxicity and cite proprietary formulas. I do not believe that is still the case in general and as noted it is the produced water, with salts and heavy metals that is most toxic, not the added chemicals to the makeup water. In any case, with better management of FPW there should continue to be less spills. Of course, all spills are a matter of concern and should be prevented as much as possible, remediated as quickly and as best as possible, and impacted areas should be monitored until toxicity is no longer present.

 

References:

 

Fracking Wastewater Causes Lasting Harm to Key Freshwater Species. Liza Gross. February 21, 2023. Inside Climate News. Fracking Wastewater Causes Lasting Harm to Key Freshwater Species - Inside Climate News

 

Persisting Effects in Daphnia magna Following an Acute Exposure to Flowback and Produced Waters from the Montney Formation. American Chemical Society. Environmental Science & Technology. Aaron Boyd, Ivy Luu, Devang Mehta, Sunil P. Myers, Connor B. Stewart, Karthik R. Shivakumar, Katherine N. Snihur, Daniel S. Alessi, Maria Camila Rodriguez Gallo, Heather Veilleux, Marin E. Wiltse, Thomas Borch, R. Glen Uhrig, and Tamzin A. Blewett* Persisting Effects in Daphnia magna Following an Acute Exposure to Flowback and Produced Waters from the Montney Formation | Environmental Science & Technology (acs.org) https://doi.org/10.1021/acs.est.2c07441

Saturday, February 18, 2023

Hydrogen Update: H2 Demand Not Likely to Increase Much Until Post-2030/2035 Even Though Many Projects Announced and IEA is Bullish

 

Hydrogen Demand and Production

     The current global demand for hydrogen for 2022 is at 95 MT, a 5% increase from 2020. Expected H2 demand in 2030 is 115 MT, a 3-3.5% increase per annum. Decarbonization models hope for a 5-6% increase per annum to 2030 so it could end up a little higher. While that is a substantial increase from present, it is hardly a “boom.” Even stretching out to 2050 hydrogen may double or triple what it is now but that is not a huge yearly increase. The main reasobn it won’t grow faster is cost. Although many projects have been announced few have reached final investment decisions (FIDs). The graph below from 2020-2021 shows the amount of hydrogen production from different sources. The difference between production and demand reflects that some hydrogen is stored underground and in pipelines. Current hydrogen with CCS, aka. blue hydrogen, is less than 1% of hydrogen production. Current green hydrogen production is closer to 0.3% of hydrogen production. Currently, 26 countries have national hydrogen strategies.   

 


 Adapted from Global CCS Institute, Data from IAE.


Hydrogen in Refining, Petrochemicals, Industry, and Transport

 

     The biggest users of hydrogen by far are the oil refining and chemicals sectors. Hydrogen is used in the refining sector mainly for desulfurization, for hydrogenating aromatics and olefins, and for hydrocracking heavier hydrocarbon molecules into lighter ones in the gasoline range. Currently, North America and China have the highest use of hydrogen in refineries followed distantly by the Middle East and Europe. Oils with higher sulfur content require more hydrogen for processing. New sulfur rules for fuels, including shipping fuel oils and gasoline, also add a little to hydrogen demand. Hydrogen is typically made at refineries by steam methane reforming. That process could be retrofitted to capture carbon. Refineries typically have hydrogen pipelines in place within and between facilities. Hydrogen pipelines are more costly and have more detailed specifications than natural gas pipelines, but hydrogen can be blended with natural gas to a certain amount and be transported in those gas pipelines without modification. However, most hydrogen projects will want to optimize production near to where it is to be used: at or near refineries, power plants, or underground or tank storage fields.

     In industry the biggest use of hydrogen is as a feedstock for ammonia in fertilizer plants. The second biggest use is as a feedstock for methanol. A new use for hydrogen in low emissions steelmaking is direct-reduced iron (DRI) powered by electric arc furnaces. If the hydrogen is green hydrogen and the electricity for the arc furnace is provided by renewables as well, the process will have the lowest emissions. It may also utilize blue hydrogen and standard grid power for less emissions reduction. DRI already takes up about 10% of industrial hydrogen for related processes. Blending hydrogen with natural gas and coal combustion can also lower emissions in existing steelmaking.

     Hydrogen use in road transport doubled from 2019 to 2021. Its use is predominantly in buses and commercial transport, although its use in cars also doubled. The first hydrogen fuel cell train fleet (14 trains) was deployed in August 2022 in Lower Saxony, Germany. The stock of fuel cell electric vehicles, mostly cars, has tripled in less than 4 years. China, Europe, and Japan are leading in hydrogen for transport and hydrogen road fueling infrastructure. Hydrogen, methanol, and ammonia are also being used in rail, cargo handling, and shipping. Its use at ports helps to lower heavy port air pollution. Methanol, followed by ammonia, then hydrogen is the most developed shipping fuel so far. Methanol is a liquid at room temperature and is less toxic than ammonia. However, ammonia has been shipped at significant levels as fertilizer feedstock for many years.

     Other uses for fuel cells are in buildings and as stationary power sources. There are plans to add more hydrogen capacity at power plants mostly to run combined-cycle gas turbines either blended with natural gas or eventually as standalone hydrogen sources. Blends with ammonia have also been announced. Europe and Asia, mostly Japan and South Korea, are expected to lead here. The IEA estimates that global capacity for hydrogen and ammonia for power production will reach about 1.4 GW by 2030.  

 

Blue Hydrogen (w/CCS) and Green Hydrogen Projections (IEA)

     If all announced projects are delivered and delivered on time, then blue hydrogen could increase by 10 MT and green hydrogen could increase by 14 MT by 2030. I would say that this goal is aspirational and unlikely since only 4% of those projects are either under construction or have reached FID. It would require blue hydrogen to grow by 10 times in 80 months and green hydrogen to grow by well over 40 times in those same 80 months. That does not seem likely at all, especially the green hydrogen scenario which is much more costly per kg of H2. I really don’t expect any major ramp-up of hydrogen till after 2030-2035.

     Green hydrogen will be the favored form of hydrogen in countries that import natural gas due to lack of domestic supply. Those countries pay a higher cost for natural gas so making hydrogen from it is uneconomic compared to countries with abundant domestic supply that export their gas. The U.S. is well situated for blue hydrogen but Europe is better situated for green hydrogen, made from water with electrolyzers powered by renewable energy. Blue hydrogen from the U.S. and other gas producing countries, including Norway, will be much cheaper to produce than green hydrogen, 3 to 4 times cheaper. Blue hydrogen is dependent on the cost of natural gas, which while volatile in 2022 has been steady in most years, especially in places that are pipeline-constrained like Appalachia. Green hydrogen is dependent on the cost of electricity as well as the output of wind and solar, which can vary. China and the EU lead in electrolyzer capacity. The U.S. is third. Japan has done much electrolyzer research but does not have a high electrolyzer capacity. Current electrolyzer capacity is at 10GW but could grow to 60-100GW by 2030. To get over 60GW capacity by 2030 will require strategic development of manufacturing and supply chains. The IEA also suggests in a graph that the cost of electrolyzers will drop by a half to two thirds by 2025. Like most of their H2 predictions, I am quite skeptical. That is less than 2 years away. Electrolyzers require nickel and platinum group minerals so the cost of those commodities will be a factor.

     Policy boosts could help deployment of both pilot and commercial projects. Global standards need to be developed as well as interoperability. Safety standards also need to be agreed. Renewables will likely be sited with electrolyzers as dedicated generation sources tied strictly to making hydrogen. They also have a high land footprint. They will likely have to be overbuilt to some extent to keep the plants running at full capacity, especially to account for daily and seasonal intermittency. They may require some storage or even back-up fossil resources to keep up full utilization. This is especially so of projects that hope to use clipped/curtailed renewables to make hydrogen in those hours when they are overproducing. The economics of those projects are affected by utilization rates that will be much lower than those with dedicated generation. Using grid power to power electrolyzers is not feasible in most cases as it could strain local power and likely require added transmission.

 

Hydrogen Infrastructure, Trade, Byproducts, Storage, and Sequential Development

 

     Hydrogen pipelines have more costly specs than natural gas pipelines. They need special materials and compressors made for hydrogen which are more expensive and more energy consuming than natural gas compressors. Hydrogen can increase the fatigue growth rate of carbon steel pipelines and degrade pipelines faster through the process of hydrogen embrittlement which makes the steel less ductile, more brittle, and thus more likely to crack. Things can be done to reduce that possibility but add to costs. The possibility of transporting and trading hydrogen as a liquid also requires many new logistical considerations. Hydrogen needs lower temperatures to liquify it than does LNG. It also requires tanks that cost about 50% more than LNG tanks. Turning it into ammonia is an option which can use the same tanks and piping, but the tank foundations need to be stronger and smaller since ammonia is much heavier than hydrogen. Thus, there are investment risks to making an LNG facility hydrogen-ready. Liquid hydrogen trade is in its infancy. Currently Japan and Australia trade but that is it. It has been estimated that H2 trade could reach 12 MT by 2030 but that seems unlikely. There are potential customers for about 2 MT and another 2.5 MT possible. Shipping routes, policy, and importing/exporting terminals need to be developed.

     A useful byproduct of green hydrogen production is pure oxygen which can be sold to medical or chemical facilities or to power plants utilizing oxyfuel combustion to optimize pre-combustion carbon capture, like those natural gas plants beginning to be commercialized using the Allam Cycle.

     Underground hydrogen storage in salt caverns is well established in the U.S. Its storage in depleted gas fields is still in the early stages as residual gas in the reservoir, chemical reactions, and the movement of hydrogen through rock porosity have some unknowns. It is likely that porous rock reservoirs, sealed aquifers, and hard rock caverns can store hydrogen adequately. It should also be noted that underground storage projects for gases take a long time to be approved and constructed.

     I and many others think that developing a blue hydrogen economy now where applicable will help in developing a green hydrogen economy later when costs come down due to technology improvements, economies of scope and scale, modularization, standardization, and cheaper, simpler, and more streamlined permitting. However, the IEA believes that the EU will go ahead with big green hydrogen ramp-up as soon as they can. I am quite skeptical of their fast timeline. The blue to green sequence will certainly work better and be more economically favorable in the U.S. and Canada. They do acknowledge their upgraded timeline may be overly ambitious in the following graph from their report which compares their 2021 projections to 2030 with their 2022 projections to 2030. One reason for the increase is the energy crisis brought on by Russian sanctions and turning away from Russian gas. However, the winter has stayed relatively warm and gas prices have stabilized so perhaps they will slow down their predictions a bit next year.

 

Source: IEA Global Hydrogen Review 2022



Conclusions

 

     While lower emissions hydrogen in its blue and green forms will no doubt increase in deployment the rate of that increase is questionable. The IAE’s ambitious near-term forecasts, especially for green hydrogen do not seem obtainable to me. However, I could be wrong as they have policies and subsidization in place to help projects along. Others issues like manufacturing and supply chain challenges don’t bode well for a fast rollout. There are other things still to be worked out. I do think hydrogen will be a growing part of the energy picture in years to come but how many years to come is the question. My guess is closer to 2035 rather than 2030.

 

References:


The Outlook for Hydrogen in an Evolving Energy Landscape (GTI Webinar, Feb. 3, 2023). Gas Technology Institute.

 

Natural Gas and Decarbonization: Key Component and Enabler of the Lower Carbon, Reasonable Cost Energy Systems of the Future: Strategies for the 2020’s and Beyond. Kent C. Stewart. March 2022. Amazon Publishing.

 

Global Hydrogen Review 2022. International Energy Agency. Clean Energy Ministerial, Hydrogen Initiative. Global Hydrogen Review 2022 (windows.net)

Thursday, February 16, 2023

CCS Challenges, Realities, History, and Future Development Prospects

 

     It’s no secret that carbon capture, transport, utilization, and storage is expensive and subject to multiple risks. CCS is not new, but each project or type of project tends to be unique and so there are technological risks. As with any new tech being scaled up there are scaling risks including availability of materials, parts, and supply chains. This has already slowed some projects. There are also permitting risks which need to be worked out as permitting can be expensive and time consuming. That is not conducive to fast, economic, and smooth project rollouts. Along with the risks it needs to be understood that CCS it has similarities to pollution abatement in that there are few financial benefits to CCS aside from utilization, the U in CCUS, and in created carbon markets. The goal is to decrease or mitigate a negative business externality in the form of an atmospheric waste product by capturing it from a combustion source or from the air, transporting, and storing it underground, by using it to do something as in enhanced oil recovery, using it as a working fluid, or transforming it into other materials, chemicals, or fuels. CCS refers to just capturing, transporting, and storing, while CCUS adds utilization. Utilization means the gas is used in a process or a product that is then sold. Thus, CCUS has some economic benefits compared to CCS. That is why most of the carbon captured up to now (73%) has been utilized for enhanced oil recovery. It has economic benefits.

     Most of the CCS projects sequestering carbon in deep saline reservoirs (69%) have been termed a part of ‘natural gas processing’ since in many cases the CO2 was produced as a component of natural gas in sour gas production from marine carbonates. The CO2 came from the gas production itself so the net CO2 stored is actually much lower than would have if that natural gas had never been produced. The IEEFA report referenced below points out that the net carbon sequestered after subtracting the production of CO2 from gas and the CO2 enabling more oil production through EOR to be burned and to make more CO2, results in much less CO2 avoided than it may appear. This is undoubtably true but it does not inform nor address the new phase of CCS now commencing that will sequester CO2 from power and industrial sources in deep saline reservoirs, much of it without utilization. This new phase will be powered by the 45Q tax credits in the U.S. and by other government incentives elsewhere. It will also be aided by newer and improved technologies and economies of scope and scale that will develop as the new CCS industry matures. The costs and timelines of permitting need to be streamlined and will be more affordable and simpler in the future. Business models and financial structure should improve modestly.

     Currently there are about 45 million tons of CO2 being sequestered annually around the world. Decarbonization goals given by the IEA and others are to have 2 billion tons sequestered annually by 2030 – that is almost 50 times what is sequestered now, and 3-5 billion tons sequestered annually by 2050 – about 100 times more than now but only double what is projected for 2030. Certainly, ramping up something to 50 times current levels in less than 7 years seems much more daunting than doubling something in 20 years! Like many decarbonization timeline pathways it is front-end loaded, and the reality may end up being less in the near-term, with catch-up later. We need more realistic timelines. Since 2010 CCS has been growing at a rate of about 10% per year so to grow it by 5000% in less than 7 years would require an annual growth rate of about 725%. However, if we only consider the 2050 goal the annual growth rate required would be about 372%, still daunting but only about half of what their timelines require in the near-term.

 

The 45Q Upgrade, The IRA, and the New Era of CCS Projects

  

     Calling the new post-revamped 45Q CCS projects commercial deployments is a stretch as it is only the tax credits that offer financial benefits unless there are carbon market benefits. In new hub models there can be benefits to small point sources to capture carbon and feed it into a communal pipeline that delivers it to communal wells. The operators of the pipelines and wells can collect fees from the point source plants to help cover operation and maintenance costs. In the EFI webinar referenced below it was pointed out that carbon capture and use does occur routinely and economically in some industries. There are about 350 acid gas plants using natural gas feedstock that capture CO2 and use it to make urea ammonium nitrate at fertilizer plants at a capture cost of about $36 per ton. In contrast, there are many different sources of CO2 in refineries which are hard and costly to capture, some uneconomic at up to $350 per ton.

     Unfortunately, a big increase in inflation has coincided with the roll-out of new CCS tax credits and that will buffer the benefits. Thus, the costs in the graph below may be higher now. Ethanol plants and natural gas processing plants are among the ‘low-hanging fruit’ that will make up many projects but overall, these sources only represent a small amount of total plant CO2. Ethanol plants just make CO2 and steam so after simply evaporating the steam there is just CO2. Thus, there are high capture rates.  

 

 

 

Levelized cost of CO2 capture by sector and initial CO2 concentration, 2019 (Last updated 26 Oct 2022). IEA. With New US 45Q Tax Credits Given for Enhanced Oil Recovery ($60/ton), Geological Storage ($85/ton), and Direct Air Capture ($180/ton)

     


   Modified from IEA

    

     In the U.S. current tax credits for CCS are at about $10 billion per year and are expected to rise to about $36 billion per year in 2031. Financers say that after grants will come the need for loans for O&M costs so that grants and loans need to be stackable. Tax credits will be transferrable, and ease of transferability is important. Data availability for each project will also be required for informed investor participation. This is true for capture, transport, and sequestration data. Open-source formats will be needed. Although there are only about 30 significant CCS projects running worldwide, there have been announcements for about 157 new projects in North America alone. Some may not be built, however, but these numbers do show that a major new CCS push is definitely on the way since the numbers for North America alone represent over 5 times or 500% growth in number of projects. And these numbers do not include micro-projects. Another aspect of the 45Q upgrades is that now smaller CO2 sources are eligible. Previously it was projects that captured 500,000 tons or more per year that were eligible. Now those smaller facilities that produce at least 25,000 tons per year are eligible. This is another way the IRA will have a big positive impact on projects. That could also aid bigger projects at the same hub or cluster at the same time by providing CO2 pipeline and well owners with additional income as they offer CO2 transport or storage as service contracts.

     It can be seen from the graph above that nearly all of the CCS projects will fall within the tax credit costs with the exception of the direct air capture projects of which only a few will. Even so, it is a very attractive framework to get the CO2 removal industry up and running.

 

Sequestration Geology

 

     It should be noted that some CCS projects have failed on the sequestration side and that successful sequestration that goes according to plan for the duration of the project is a major key to overall project success. Sequestration success is based on geology, particularly on accurate reservoir characterization. There needs to be a porous and permeable reservoir with a structural and/or stratigraphic trap, and a seal over the trap made by impermeable rock. Both buoyant and capillary traps can work. Saline aquifers can meet these conditions. Certain types of reservoirs, depths, and reservoir pressure are ideal for CO2 sequestration. Depths of at least 2400-4000ft are required. This is because CO2 needs to be compressed into a supercritical state in order to inject it in sufficient amounts. Its pressure needs to stay well below natural reservoir pressure which increases with depth in general. The supercritical state gives it properties of both a liquid and a gas. It is buoyant compared to other reservoir fluids and tends to move upward. That is why trapping and seals are very important with CO2. Normally pressured reservoirs are much better than overpressured reservoirs. This is because reservoir pressure will naturally increase as CO2 is injected and if that pressure exceeds the frac gradient then there may be inadvertent hydraulic fracturing of the reservoir which could lead to a breach of the reservoir seal and migrating of CO2 up above the intended zone. An already overpressured reservoir will have less room to avoid exceeding the frac gradient. Rocks that are too deep may also have pressures high enough that seal rupture through induced seismicity – causing an earthquake due to injection pressure rising too high or too fast - is possible. Thus, a ‘Goldilocks’ zone in terms of depth, pressure, and porosity/permeability is desired. Supercritical CO2 has a high solubility rate so over time it dissolves into the formation brine and sinks. The CO2 also reacts with rock to form minerals which can be considered another type of sequestration. Marine sands can be ideal reservoirs since they tend to be continuous in their porosity and permeability both laterally and in 3D. Carbonates can work as well but have some potential drawbacks. Faults and fractures, especially unsealed ones, need to be avoided. Mechanical properties of the reservoir rock need to be known through stress tests.

 

Geological Sequestration Analysis of Five CCS Mega-Projects

 

     This analysis was done by geologist Jason Eleson, owner of Geointegra Consulting, in an excellent webinar titled CCS: Flop or the Future? As Jason is a geoscientist like me, I especially found his geological analyses useful. First, he covers Sleipnir Project in the North Sea run by Equinor. The Sleipnir project sequesters CO2 derived from their nearby natural gas field with high CO2 content so it can be considered a gas processing CCS project. Gas processing CCS projects are limited to the reservoirs available near the natural gas source. Since beginning injection in 1996 it has run continually and has been a success. It was injected via a lateral well with 125 ft of perforations into a thick marine sand at the center of the Viking Graben with structural and stratigraphic trapping. The CO2 plume was expected to move out away from the well at a rate of about 100 meters per year but ended up moving out at a rate of 300 meters per year. It is expected to meet final injection goals soon and will likely be abandoned after that as planned. Seismic lines shot through time for monitoring have confirmed expected amplitude changes due to CO2 infiltration into the reservoir. Pressure has remained constant and near hydrostatic in the reservoir throughout injection. The IEEFA report attributed Sleipnir’s capturing success to Norwegian government incentives, notably the tax on CO2 introduced in 1991. While that no doubt was a key motivation for initiating the project, the main reason for the success was favorable geology.

     The Quest Project in Alberta Canada injects CO2 from hydrogen production by steam methane reforming (blue hydrogen) into a thick basal Cambrian marine sand with structural and stratigraphic trapping and good seals made by shale and salt bodies. The reservoir, seals, and pressures have all worked according to plan and injection rates are maintained. They did have some problems with salt accumulation due to CO2 dehydrating the reservoir brine. They clean out the salt with glycols. Monitoring wells have shown that the CO2 infiltrated the reservoir porosity as intended.

     The Snohvit project in the Norwegian Sea injected first into a downblock graben into fluvial-deltaic sandstones. The formation was overpressured. Although cores showed very good porosity and permeability there were also shales intermingled, as is the nature of fluvial-deltaics, which created barriers or baffles. This caused the reservoir to pressure up faster than expected. They had hoped that faults would cause CO2 to leak out which would drop pressure, but this did not happen. They then switched to Plan B, which was to inject into a shallower marine sand. This has worked much better.

     The Gorgon project in Australia run by Chevron injects CO2 into 9 wells into a porous turbidite sandstone with 4 water wells drilled updip to draw off water to lower pressure to stay below frac gradient. Trapping is stratigraphic and capillary. CO2 injection has worked well. However, the water wells have clogged with sand so pressure was not drawn down enough and they were ordered by Australian regulatory authorities to lower injection rates and ended up venting CO2. They hope to soon get back to regular injection rates of 4 million tons per year (about 10% of current global CO2 injection). Another problem they encountered is that when the pressure drops after the water is drawn off, the sand, which is coated with chlorite clays, has a tendency to crumble which can lower permeability.

     The In Salah project in Algeria sequesters CO2 from another high CO2-content gas field. Initial injection rates were satisfactory. They were injecting into an estuarine sandstone with variable porosity, downdip from the higher porosity gas field. That lower and lack of uniform porosity caused pressure to rise above frac gradient and likely hydraulically fractured the reservoir and broke the seal. This is what likely caused the CO2 to move along faults and fractures which was not intended. The project was abandoned with only 3.8 million tons injected of the total planned of 17-23 million tons.

     He also noted some other geologic risk factors for CO2. In carbonates there are sometimes vugs and caverns which can have the same effect as faults and fractures and invalidate capillary trapping. Salt plugging as mentioned can be problematic. CO2 hydrates can form when there is water injected with CO2 which can react with carbonates. This can also be an issue but is usually less of a problem than salt plugging.

 

Past CCS Mega-Projects Were Dominated by Enhanced Oil Recovery and Natural Gas Processing of Gas with High CO2-Content

 

     The IEEFA report points this out and also shows that most of the CCS projects of the past were involved with producing hydrocarbons and had little or nothing to do with emissions reductions except that when were a response to compulsory emissions reduction mandates or CO2 taxation. There are some sour gas reservoirs with very high CO2 content. Sometimes in the past those were vented into the atmosphere. The Indian Creek field in West Virginia was developed in 1960’s in the Silurian aged Tuscarora Sandstone. The field produced about an equal amount of CO2 and natural gas. The CO2 was sold to Coca Cola for use in beverages. I worked on a Tuscarora test well in the 90’s about a county away from there. We ran a gas detector for methane, an H2S detector, and a CO2 detector. When we drilled into the formation the CO2 detector maxed out – the most it could read was 10% CO2 - so I noticed what the reading was on the methane detector when it maxed out and compared the final reading on the methane detector to estimate the total CO2 content which was found to be close to 50% of the total gas stream. There was an attempt to flare the gas but as CO2 is a natural fire retardant the gas would not light. I believe that well was plugged and abandoned soon after drilling. Equinor’s Sleipnir field in contrast has a CO2 content of 4-9% and their Snohvit field in the Norwegian Sea has a CO2 content of 5-8%.  

     Exxon’s Shute’s Creek Field CCS project in Wyoming is the third oldest in the world and the largest. It was commissioned in 1986 with the vast majority of the CO2 sold for EOR. The CO2 content of the gas is a whopping 65%, with methane only at 21%. The project was successful at selling CO2 for EOR when there was a demand for it but when there was not a demand for it the CO2 was vented into the atmosphere. As the second graph below from the IFEEA report shows the planned venting over the project life was 54 million tons but the actual venting was 120 million tons – equivalent to three years of global sequestration now. Thus, in terms of carbon emissions the project was a complete disaster. 


Shutes Creek CO2 Targets, Utilization and Sequestration, and Total Emissions 


Shutes Creek Planned CO2 Emissions vs. Real CO2 Emissions



     Equinor’s Snohvit project is an LNG development in the Barents Sea off Northern Norway, commissioned in 2007. The raw gas is delivered to shore, and the CO2 is solidified into dry ice and removed from the gas, then pumped back into the offshore reservoir for storage. As mentioned, this project was also a technical and geologic success, after changing the storage reservoir to a marine sand with uniform properties.

 

 The Strong Anti-CCS Bias of the IEEFA Report

 

     The IEFFA paper: The Carbon Capture Crunch: Lessons Learned, notes that these gas processing CCS projects that involve natural gas with high CO2 content do not adequately address Scope 3 emissions. It merely minimizes production-related Scope 1 emissions from gas with excessive CO2 content. Total emissions are barely dented. The same is true as I have argued, with venting methane from so-called ‘gassy’ coal mines. Mitigating that methane simply involves flaring it rather than venting it which reduces the total greenhouse gas emissions. If Shutes Creek and some of the gassy mines in Southwest Virginia had been subject to CO2 taxes like those in Norway or methane taxes in the case of the mines, they likely would not have been developed. Energy extraction companies are Scope 3-heavy, with up to 90% of their emissions being from end-use combustion. Of course, one might also attribute those Scope 3 emissions to their buyers like power plants. The IEFFA report notes: “In general, due to its association with EOR and historic capture rate issues, carbon capture in the natural gas processing sector has minimal environmental and social credibility as a decarbonisation option.” I agree with them concerning natural gas processing of gas with high CO2 content but EOR does sequester significant amounts of CO2 and utilizes the CO2 for oil production that otherwise would not occur. Of course, EOR from CO2 captured from power plants or industry would not have the added CO2 from the gas field and so would be much better from a decarbonization standpoint.  

     While the IEEFA report is informative and useful I also see some pretty heavy bias. Here is an example regarding gas processing CCS projects:   {they} “… would be operating through the next one or two decades until renewables, green hydrogen and battery technologies take up the whole energy system.” One to two decades? That is way off the mark even by super-fast decarbonization standards and basically an irresponsible statement due to its infeasibility. The paper goes on to show the underperformance of several of these early CCS projects, some just mild underperformance. As many of these were pilot projects or first-of-their-kind projects there would be some expectations of not meeting targets. The Petro Nova coal CCS project was just slightly under target projections and though shut-down after COVID due to low oil prices, is slated to finally start back up. It was a technical success with pretty high capture rates. The paper emphasizes CCS opex costs and operations emissions as failures but in most cases, those were factored into the projects, although going over cost is not unexpected with new and pilot projects. Another biased statement in the report is this declaration: “The era of fossil-based power plants is over.” Last I heard China, India, Pakistan, South Africa, and South Asian countries were planning on building many new coal plants and new natural gas plants are being built and will be needed in the U.S. and in many other countries. Gas and coal still make more electricity by far than any other source. Retrofitting coal plants is more complicated and expensive compared to combined cycle natural gas plants where carbon capture can be more standardized. However, more CO2 can be captured at the coal plants since they produce more CO2. It is quite true that the Kemper plant in Mississippi was a complete failure, both technically and economically. Some of those failures came before the decision to capture carbon. There were big problems with its unproven coal gasification systems.

     In considering blue hydrogen the paper invokes work done by strongly biased scientists at Cornell and Stanford who wildly overestimate methane emissions from natural gas production to argue that even with CCS blue hydrogen is emissions intense. This is incorrect. As the paper was written in 2022 when gas prices were high they note that makes these projects uneconomic. However, since then gas prices, elevated due to shortages in Europe due to avoiding Russian gas, have come down. Even so, blue hydrogen will work best in places where gas prices are likely to remain low, such as pipeline-constrained Appalachia where gas is abundant and cheap. It will not work in Europe, except maybe in Norway. While its economics are subject to the volatility of gas prices, certain regional gas prices have remained constantly low for years with the exception of 2022.

     The paper also points out several times that total CO2 captured does not reflect CO2 avoided since energy is consumed operating the capture, transport, and sequestration processes. Of course, this is well known, and I do not think there is anyone suggesting that total CO2 captured = total CO2 avoided.

     The Great Plains Synfuels Gasification plant in North Dakota is an example of a lignite coal that is used to produce natural gas from gasifying coal into syngas. Lignite coal is the lowest rank and highest emitting coal. It is the only coal-to-syngas plant in operation in the U.S. and has been operating since 1984. Carbon capture for EOR began in 2000. Before that the CO2 was vented. Thus, this is another example of a plant that emits more CO2 than other plants of its type due to resource quality. Thus, as in the high-CO2 content gas processing and gassy coal mines, the avoided CO2 is much less than the captured CO2. The plant may be purchased for a blue hydrogen project to be made foften stranded associated gas from the Bakken oil fields. That could lower flaring rates as well.

     The report also characterizes an underperforming ethanol CCS project for saline aquifer sequestration and a successfully performing nitrogen fertilizer CCS project for EOR that also uses some of the CO2 in an acid gas process to make urea ammonium nitrate, quite economically as fertilizer plants do. They also talk a bit about a new project in the Middle East aiming to capture carbon from steel-making. Again, they tout currently uneconomic processes like green hydrogen and new and not-ready-for-primetime techniques like so-called ‘green steel’ by direct reducing iron with green hydrogen, and of course, solar, wind, and storage over any fossil fuels.

     I guess I should have noted their bias in their mission statement: “About IEEFA: The Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEEFA) examines issues related to energy markets, trends, and policies. The Institute’s mission is to accelerate the transition to a diverse, sustainable, and profitable energy economy.”

 

Other CCS Co-Benefits and Risks

 

     One major co-benefit of CCS can be capture of other combustion pollutants including many criteria pollutants with the CO2 stream which can reduce local air pollution.  SO2 in particular, but also NOx, VOCs, particulates and heavy metals may be captured, although many of the latter two end up in the significant volumes of fly ash at coal and biomass plants that must be managed. Waste-to-Energy plants typically have a very low CO2 capture rate, around 10%, so are not good candidates at present for CCS. Another possible risk is the creation of hazardous air pollutants (HAPs) in the breakdown of the solvents used in the carbon capture process. Those need to be mitigated.

 

Conclusions          

 

     While past CCS in particular has been quite expensive, quite dependent on subsidization, with some underperforming and failed projects, that is not unexpected with new and newly implemented technologies without standardization, modularization, supply chains, and economies of scope and scale to lower costs, climb the learning curves faster, and improve success rates. I believe with those improvements and with continued needed subsidization it could be much more successful in the new phase we are entering. Dependence on subsidization will decrease through time. Streamlining permitting will also reduce costs and timelines. Currently, permit approval time is in the range of 18-36 months so a speed up there would be helpful as each type of project gets better understood by regulators and as duplicatory regulation is reduced or eliminated. Such actions would also reduce regulatory uncertainties which can affect financing.  O&M costs can vary quite a bit depending on type of project, generally from 5-25% with some in the past hitting 30%. In the near-term constraints on availability of pipes, steel, chillers, compression equipment, heat exchangers, and labor may slow project development. Cash flow models in various CCS projects are also full of risks and uncertainty and as those become better understood the financial processes can be streamlined. The generous IRA upgrades to the 45Q credits will be helpful.

 

 

References:

 

Energy Futures Initiative Webinar. Turning CCS Projects into Blue Chip Investments: Policy Action. February 14, 2023.

 

Webinar: Geointegra Consulting. CCS: Flop or the Future? A technical evaluation of recent commercial Carbon Capture and Storage projects. February 8, 2023. CCS - Flop or Future? - Bing video

 

Levelised cost of CO2 capture by sector and initial CO2 concentration, 2019. Last updated 26 Oct 2022. International Energy Agency. Levelised cost of CO2 capture by sector and initial CO2 concentration, 2019 – Charts – Data & Statistics - IEA

 

Carbon Capture Is Coming Under Fire For Underperforming. Felicity Bradstock. Oilprice.com. February 9, 2023. Carbon Capture Is Coming Under Fire For Underperforming | OilPrice.com

 

Webinar. Carbon Capture Outlook. Presented on February 1, 2023. Todd Bush. Decarbonfuse.com.

 

The Carbon Capture Crux: Lessons Learned. Bruce Robertson, LNG/Gas Analyst and Milad Mousavian, Energy Analyst. September 2022. Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA). The Carbon Capture Crux.pdf

 

The Tax Credit for Carbon Sequestration (Section 45Q). Congressional Research Service. June 8, 2021. The Tax Credit for Carbon Sequestration (Section 45Q) (fas.org)

    Uranium is produced or able to be produced in six U.S. states: Wyoming. Texas, Nebraska, New Mexico, South Dakota, and Utah. However, c...

Index of Posts (Linked)