EV Resource Intensity and Emissions Intensity: Much Cleaner to Run but Dirtier to Build: Variations and Uncertainties Abound

     EVs may make sense for places like California where there is a problem with air pollution due to weather inversions and smog and there is a wealthy sector of the population that can afford EVs. However, for the rest of us, they are not a great choice, even with generous subsidies. Range anxiety is still a concern although that problem is likely to go away in the future, likely in a few years, as more powerful batteries and new battery types such as solid-state batteries with longer ranges and faster charging times go on the market. The upfront cost is a big factor for most people and will continue to limit sales.   

     Mark P. Mills, a physicist and engineer, who has long done research and writing for the conservative think tank Manhattan Institute regarding the real-world challenges of the energy transition, published a paper in July 2023, Electric Vehicles for Everyone? The Impossible Dream, details the real challenges of EV ramp-up, especially resource intensity and consumer uptake. This blog post is mostly a summary and review of Mills’ paper.

     Mills makes two key points in the executive summary: 1) No one knows how much, if at all, CO2 emissions will decline as EV use rises – it is a rough estimate. 2) No one knows when or whether EVs will reach economic parity with the cars that most people drive – EV cost is tied to critical minerals costs, which fluctuate according to supply and demand.

     He points out that one-third of EVs sold are hybrids and that two-thirds of EVs sold in the U.S. in 2022 were Teslas, which are basically luxury cars for carbon-conscious rich people, I mean who can afford a Tesla? Mills calls out the “ICE prohibitionists.” Much like the anti-fossil fuel crowd, these advocates are profoundly unrealistic. The vast majority of primary energy production is fossil fuels, and the vast majority of mobile vehicles are powered by ICE engines. While it is fine to advance more non-fossil fuel energy and more EVs, problems emerge when there are attempts to mandate that advancement and put unrealistic time limits on the mandates. He points out that for the average household personal mobility is the biggest cost after a mortgage. “A car is the single most expensive product that 98% of consumers ever purchase.”

 

ICE Emissions vs. EV Emissions

 

     While it is easy and straightforward to determine the emissions of ICE vehicles, this is not so for EVs. After manufacturing emissions are determined ICE emissions are mainly operational due to the burning of gasoline or diesel. EV emissions are all related to manufacturing but their vastly higher resource requirements in the form of critical minerals require much more work to determine the manufacturing emissions. Battery minerals are what powers EVs and these battery minerals are often rare and difficult to obtain and process. One might also consider that the upfront emissions related to materials acquisition and manufacture of EVs are much higher than the upfront emissions of ICE vehicles.

     Mills points out that EV material acquisition emissions are all rough estimates, but I think these can be put into general ranges for each mineral so that the estimates are not as “unknowable” as he seems to suggest. Mills writes:

 

“While there are dozens of variations, a typical EV battery weighs about 1,000 pounds and contains about 30 pounds of lithium, 60 pounds of cobalt, 130 pounds of nickel, 190 pounds of graphite, 90 pounds of copper, and about 400 pounds of steel, aluminum, and various plastic components.”

 

“These five elements total ~100,000 pounds of ore to fabricate one EV battery. To properly account for all the earth moved, there’s also the overburden, the materials first dug up to get to the ore; depending on ore type and location, it averages three to seven tons of overburden removed to access each ton of ore, thus ~500,000 pounds total. The exact number varies for different batteries and mines. Note that this doesn’t include large quantities of chemicals to process and refine the ores, or the mining/refining for the other 400 pounds of battery minerals used (e.g., steel, aluminum).”

 

Most of the materials for ICE vehicles are iron, steel, and plastic. These are mostly produced domestically in the U.S. and there is much better transparency about the emissions associated with their mining and fabrication than there is with many of the EV minerals produced and processed around the globe with non-transparent China leading the pack by a vast margin.

     Mills gives the IEA’s life-cycle emissions for EVs vs. ICE vehicles shown below. He points out the reliance on assumptions evident in the black error bars which acknowledge that there is a chance that lifetime EV emissions could be as high as ICE emissions in some cases. Those error bars are huge and that lends credence to the possibility that EV emissions could be much higher than predicted and shows a level of uncertainty that should be considered to be unacceptable.

 

 

     Mills also points out that the IEA uses a “40 kWh battery pack, which is half the size of the batteries in most popular EVs” and that the trend in the future is likely to be bigger batteries with more range since range parity with ICE vehicles has yet to be achieved. However, that may not be the case, since newer battery types may end up being lighter and less mineral-intense. He also claims the IAE analysis ignores that greater use of aluminum in EV frames reduces the weight. Aluminum mining and processing are emissions intense, so he is claiming that there are missing emissions here.

     He gives another graph from a 2022 study that compares emissions on the renewables-heavy EU grid from Volkswagen diesel and EV models that shows that the EV emissions are higher than the diesel emissions till the odometer reaches about 75,000 miles, again showing that EV emissions are front-end loaded. The emissions would be a little higher on a global average grid. He shows a similar graph for Volvo models. The global average for emissions parity seems to be about 55,000 miles at a glance but this could be off either way.

     Mills next gives the known unknowns, the uncertainties of EV emission determinations. He gives ten of these which I will examine: 1) size of the battery pack – he notes that most past analyses have been based on smaller and lighter batteries but with the need for range parity a true equivalent comparison with ICE vehicles will require using heavier batteries that use more minerals in those analyses. 2) location of the mines – he notes that 80-90% of the mines are located outside of the U.S. and that for each mineral the emissions can vary quite a bit by where they are mined, especially for copper (by up to 2 times) and nickel (by up to 3 times). 3) location of minerals processing and refining facilities – Mills suggests that some previous calculations may not consider that China processes 50-90% of the world’s energy minerals. I would add that much of that processing would likely be powered by coal. I am unsure whether or not previous analyses take this into account, and he is vague on this point. 4) location of the battery and EV assembly factory – he points out that assembly plants in Norway with 90% hydroelectric power would have far less emissions than assembly plants in China where two-thirds of all power is provided by coal. He also notes that half of all EVs produced globally in 2022 were made in China. 5) battery chemistry – here he notes that even with about a dozen different battery chemistries their resource intensities are more or less the same. He also notes that lithium-iron-phosphate (LPO) batteries, popular in China, do not use cobalt and nickel but do have about 20% less energy density than those that do so those advantages are offset by the loss in energy density. He doesn’t mention some other new battery chemistries possible in the future that may have the ability to reduce resource intensity without giving up energy density. 6) material for the rest of the vehicle – here he asserts that EVs use far more copper in the electric motor and wiring and far more aluminum in the frames than do ICE vehicles and that many past analyses do not take this into account. 7) emissions from EV power electronics – he notes here that EVs use about 200% more electronics for power management and manufacturing these electronics is more energy and emissions intense. He notes a study suggesting that accounting for this is equivalent to driving an ICE vehicle about 3000 miles. 8) battery life span – this assumes the fact that fast charging shortens battery life relative to slow charging. Another factor to consider that I will mention is that the hype over V2G – using EVs to power the grid at high energy demand times – also degrades the battery and shortens battery life. Some studies should assume two batteries per vehicle. This is not hyperbole. My Toyota Prius required a new battery, in this case though, a refurbished one so no additional resource intensity. As the life of an EV battery is currently 8-10 years, some EV owners will require two EV batteries for the life of the car. If we consider that some ICE vehicles are still on the road after 30 years, even three batteries are not out of the question. I do believe battery life will increase in the future so this will not be a concern at some point. 9) total miles – here he gives some data that on average EVs are driven half the miles per year as ICE vehicles. That means that it takes longer in time for an EV to achieve emissions parity with ICE vehicles. That would make an EV's emissions per mile higher (before parity). 10 Ice fuel efficiency – here he gives the interesting point that ICE fuel economy is improving and is expected to continue to improve so that predictions for 2030 are for a 30-50% improvement in efficiency, which translates to equivalent lower emissions per mile. I plan to write a post about ICE improvements and research in the near future. He gives a graph for this, but it starts in 2018. If he had started in 2022/2023 which he could and should have, the predicted improvement would be 10-30%. However, in terms of the vehicles on the road, averages, and penetration of better mileages in those averages, it is perhaps not a bad prediction.

     The biggest emissions from EVs by a very wide margin are the mining and processing of minerals. He rightly points out that recycling of EV minerals will remain irrelevant and a tiny percentage of total minerals for quite a long time. The main reason is cost. The IEA estimates recycling may account for just 1-2% of EV minerals by 2030. Mining and processing EV minerals also have many negative environmental impacts and human rights issues, often amidst a significant lack of transparency that would not be tolerated in the U.S. and other developed countries. While Congolese cobalt mining, so-called dangerous artisanal mining by kids is a huge human rights concern, the issue of water use by South American lithium brine operations is a minor environmental issue as the area is extremely dry unliving desert and the water extracted from the ground is twice as salty as seawater so not consumable.  

     Next, he considers the fact that upstream EV emissions are actually rising. This is because mineral ore grades are lowering as high-grade ores are used up so lower-grade ores are being mined more. This results in higher emissions per ton of ore mined. This is particularly true for copper and nickel. Lower-grade ores simply mean more rock is mined to get the same amount of minerals. This equals higher emissions. While making mining less energy intensive is being pursued, even the IEA acknowledges that minerals production is likely to get more energy intensive. Mills says “likely” is an understatement, and that minerals production will definitely get more energy intensive. He gives data that copper, nickel, and lithium production are all getting more energy-intensive, which also means more emissions intense. He also considers trends in electrifying mining processes and technological trends in new battery chemistries and other battery breakthroughs. Here he points out that while such improvements and breakthroughs are possible, they are not at all likely in a time frame within a decade or two, while EV adoption is being pushed to be accelerated more and more. The reality is that even with considerable incentives, the high costs of EVs are slowing adoption and potentially affecting the economics of auto manufacturers that are losing money on EVs even while they are investing heavily. The recent autoworker strikes of the Big 3 in the U.S. suggest to me that the Big 3 may be considering the potential of losses due to overfocus on EVs in the near term in their negotiations. Indeed, I just heard a radio news segment that auto companies were citing the costly shift to EVs as one reason they are resisting UAW demands. The shift to EVs is also affecting autoworkers in other ways. More of them are losing their jobs since fewer workers are required to build EVs compared to ICE vehicles. Some of those workers can work at new battery plants but it seems that fewer workers will be needed overall.

     Next, he considers more uncertainties with EV emissions such as emissions of charging. These depend on what powers the grid where they are charged and can vary dramatically. In places like Wyoming or West Virginia where over 90% of the grid is powered by coal, EV charging emissions are much higher than say Germany or California. When an EV is charged is also a consideration since solar drops off at night and fossil fuels provide the and in other more power in high-demand times. Other considerations include real-world testing versus “sticker” mileage calculations. He points to one study that showed that sticker mileage is more accurate for ICE vehicles than for EVs, that actual EV mileage is about 12.5% lower than sticker, while ICE mileage is about 4% lower than sticker.

     Car & Driver’s Dave Vanderwerp describes why EVs are tested the way they are. They do pre-test charging and standing-start acceleration in a standard way. They do a 75mph range test in a standard way on the same road to compare ranges for different EVs. Vanderwerp notes that some EVs come in a full 20% below sticker range but most German manufactured models come in at range or slightly above. Tesla has been accused of vastly overstating range. He notes: “A range discrepancy between EVs from different companies might not be as extreme as the numbers would suggest. "400 miles of stated range for a Tesla and 300 miles for a Porsche is pretty much the same number at real highway speeds.”  One might ask the question - if Volkswagon paid a heavy price in the tens of billions for cheating on emissions tests, then why do companies like Tesla get to essentially cheat on range tests without consequence? A lower range does mean higher emissions per mile and even if those emissions are less than ICE emissions, it still gives a deceptive emissions determination.  

      Another consideration is that EV mileage drops in lower temperatures – that EV mileage drops by about 30% at 20deg F, while ICE mileage only drops by about 5% at that temperature. In addition, an EV does not produce much waste heat while an ICE vehicle scavenges waste heat from the engine to heat the interior of the car, although he doesn’t point out that the opposite is likely true for air conditioning, although heating is more energy intensive than A/C. In any case, EVs are significantly more energy and emissions-intensive in colder climates in general.

     Next, he discusses parity, including cost parity, operating costs parity, convenience parity, and parity in terms of supply chains and environmental impacts. EVs still cost significantly more than ICE vehicles. However, they are cheaper to operate, cheaper to fuel, and require far less regular maintenance including no oil changes. Future costs of EVs are dependent on battery minerals costs which in turn are dependent on costs of minerals and supply chains from foreign countries. While minerals costs had been dropping, they have risen or stagnated in the last few years for a number of reasons, some temporary and some not. The graph below simply shows that the global mining industry is not well ready for a deep acceleration of energy transition buildout which includes EVs.

 

 

Mills thinks that mineral mining and processing monopolies, cartels, and protectionist rules will stay the same or increase in the future, even as countries like the U.S. seek to develop domestic supplies. He shows some predictions that copper and nickel prices are set to rise from the mid-2020s to the 2040s.

     He also considers the need for massive new charging infrastructure in an accelerated EV scenario. When I had a plug-in hybrid EV, I had a Level 2 charger installed at home. I did some of the work myself which lowered the cost. It was great, to be honest. But if tens of thousands of people in a small area each have one installed it would strain the local grid. At current EV ranges there is a need for significantly more available chargers per area than for gas stations. These factors require the utility to upgrade equipment. Public chargers have added costs, especially fast chargers.

     As I have argued in the past, if and when EVs are adopted at levels exceeding ICE cars then all the money lost in gasoline taxes that funds many things would have to be recouped somehow. For a few years now states have been enacting EV ownership taxes, usually at a few hundred dollars per year. Massive EV expansion will require grid upgrades and grid transmission expansion. This is in addition to those needs for wind and solar expansion so grid reliability could also be affected.  

     He mentions that EV owners report a higher incidence of problems than ICE owners in the first year of ownership, often electrical issues. I can say having owned a plug-in hybrid EV for over a year I experienced zero issues. He also considers battery waste disposal costs which could end up being bolted on to the purchase price.

     While pro-green enthusiasts may say that EVs make us more energy-independent they rarely concede that they make us far more mining and processing-dependent. Minerals production and processing are even more concentrated than oil production. The graph below shows just how dependent we are on China for EV minerals and mineral processing. The graph may be a few years old since now the U.S. exports more LNG than Qatar which is not as depicted.

 

 

He notes: “The U.S. today is dependent on imports for 100% of some 17 critical minerals, and, for 28 others, net imports account for more than half of existing domestic demand. Assembling batteries (or solar hardware) here creates underlying dependencies equivalent to assembling conventional automobiles domestically but importing all the key parts and all the fuel.” We should learn from the mistake of EU dependence on Russian oil & gas and not get overly dependent on Chinese minerals and processing. While it is true that we are working on domestic and friendlier country supplies and processing capacity, that is likely to take a long time and not likely to compete with Chinese prices kept low by government subsidies.

     While I am annoyed by guys with big trucks “rolling coal” in front of me while I have to breathe it – this happened to me just yesterday – I am also bullish on efficiency improvements to ICE vehicles that could render EV benefits less beneficial. I also like electric motors, their efficiency, the ability to charge up at home at night, to get fantastic mileage, a quiet ride, no oil changes, etc. I don’t have the data, but I tend to disagree with Mills' suggestions about EV reliability. I think they are probably much more reliable than he suggests. Though just a hybrid, buying a Prius on the first day of 2006 turned out to be one of the best financial decisions I ever made for a number of reasons. However, we do have to be realistic. While I don’t agree with all of Mills’ assessments it was a great paper, and I would guess based on all of his points that on that first graph, the real-world emissions advantage of EVs is up on that error bar – my guess is that the reality is that an EV could be as much 75% as emissions intense as an ICE vehicle and that conclusion added to the other issues and inconveniences of EVs suggests that currently a lower mileage ICE vehicle, a hybrid, or a plug-in hybrid are much better choices. I realize that this is almost twice as much as other studies, but Mills’ work strongly suggests that we are significantly underestimating the emissions intensity of EVs. That may not be true in the future, but I think it is now. In any case, I can no longer afford anything but a used ICE vehicle anyway and that is true for many. It is also true that EV subsidies have gone vastly disproportionately to wealthy people since one has to be wealthy to afford a Tesla.

 

 

McKinsey & Company Thinks EV Emissions Intensity Can Be Steeply Reduced During the Next 5-10 Years

 

     McKinsey & Company released a study examining EV decarbonization efforts in February 2023. Regarding the variations in EV emissions, they noted: “Emission levels from EV battery production depend on a variety of factors, including design choices, vehicle type, range, and freight requirements, as well as production and sourcing locations. The energy sources used to produce various battery components are one of the biggest factors explaining the wide variation in the carbon footprint of different OEMs (original equipment manufacturers).” The graph below compares EVs and ICE emissions by material and type.

 

 

     The authors believe that steep reductions in carbon emissions are possible in the next 5-10 years. They cite battery chemistry, production technology, the selection of raw material suppliers, and transportation routes as key areas where emissions can be reduced. What powers the mining, manufacturing, and delivery processes is also a factor. The graph below shows variances by region and production sector within each region.

 

 

     They note that China makes 70% of global batteries and has the most emissions-intensive manufacturing. Citing incentives like the EU's carbon border adjustment mechanism and the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act they think it is feasible to drastically reduce EV emissions by 2030. I am somewhat skeptical knowing all the challenges such as supply chain issues, regulatory and permitting issues, and public opposition issues rampant with renewables acceleration. They are bullish on electrification in the near term. I don’t disagree with their assessment, but I do think they are too optimistic with their timeframe. I think it will take another 5 or more likely 10 years. I do think that range issues, charging issues, emissions issues, battery waste disposal issues, and safety issues will all be solved in time. I also think that the rush to ban ICE vehicles and to make other mandates is both unnecessary and bound to fail for a number of reasons.

 

 

 

References:

EPA is ignoring the glaring problem with dirty electric vehicles. Benjamin Zycher. The Hill. EPA is ignoring the glaring problem with dirty electric vehicles (msn.com)

Electric Vehicles for Everyone? The Impossible Dream. Mark P. Mills. Manhattan Institute. July 2023. Electric Vehicles for Everyone? The Impossible Dream | Manhattan Institute (manhattan-institute.org)

The Hidden Carbon Footprint Of Electric Vehicles. Quina Baterna. Slash Gear. August 19, 2023. The Hidden Carbon Footprint Of Electric Vehicles (msn.com)

The race to decarbonize electric-vehicle batteries. McKinsey & Company. February 23, 2023. The race to decarbonize electric-vehicle batteries | McKinsey

Electric Vehicle Myths. U.S. EPA. Electric Vehicle Myths | US EPA

The Hazards of Electric Car Batteries and Their Recycling. Taotianchen Wan and Yikai Wang. 2022 IOP Conf. Ser.: Earth Environ. Sci. 1011 012026. The Hazards of Electric Car Batteries and Their Recycling - IOPscience

Is it Ethical to Purchase a Lithium Battery Powered EV? Ronald Stein, P.E. June 13, 2022. Is it Ethical to Purchase a Lithium Battery Powered EV? – The Heartland Institute

Electric cars are made of pollution and human misery. Kathryn Porter. The Telegraph. August 20, 2023. Electric cars are made of pollution and human misery (msn.com)

EVs Fall Short of EPA Estimates by a Much Larger Margin Than Gas Cars in Our Real-World Highway Testing. Caleb Miller. Car and Driver. August 20, 2023. EVs Fall Short of EPA Estimates by a Much Larger Margin Than Gas Cars in Our Real-World Highway Testing (msn.com)

Why We Test EVs the Way We Do. Car and Driver. Dave Vanderwerp.  October 3, 2022. Why We Test EVs the Way We Do (caranddriver.com)

 

Energy Scams: Illegal and Deceptive Energy Practices: Part 2: Oil Theft, Illegal Refining, and Illegal Oil Sales in the Niger Delta in Southern Nigeria

    In 2015 I read Naomi Klein’s book, This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs. the Climate, where she praised revolutionaries in the Niger Delta as fighting a righteous battle against a government in cahoots with sinister foreign oil companies who cared only for profit, not for the poor people who lived in the region. I remember talking to a colleague in the oil & gas industry telling me about a rig there that was attacked by these rebels, decades before, maybe in the 70s or 80s where much of the rig crew were killed. He knew someone who was there that lived through it. I thought Klein’s advocacy for anti-extractivist grassroots movements using the violent Niger Delta rebels as a positive example was rather sickening. In fact, those rebels rather than the oil companies are the ones who wreaked massive environmental havoc in the area.

     The Niger Delta has been a hot spot for oil theft for quite a long time. According to Wikipedia: “Oil theft in Nigeria is facilitated by the pragmatic co-operation between security forces, militia organizations, the local population, and oil company employees who use a variety of methods to steal oil from the multinational oil corporations that are stationed within the country. Currently, Exxon Mobil, Chevron, Equinor, Shell, and Agip are the five largest multinational oil companies present in Nigeria.” Thus, we can see that it is highly coordinated corruption, a criminal enterprise. Most oil is stolen by tapping into pipelines (cold tapping and hot tapping), but oil trucks and oil terminals can also be targets. Muhammadu Buhari, president of Nigeria from 2015-2023, attempted to target the enterprises but this led to more violence as militant groups were involved in the oil theft networks. Some pipelines were sabotaged as well and quite a bit of oil was spilled creating environmental pollution. Since nearly 83% of Nigeria’s export revenue comes from exports of oil and petroleum products, money can be made from the thievery. 70-80% of Nigeria’s oil production comes from the Niger Delta region. A 2013 report by British think tank Chatham House estimated that over 100,000 barrels of oil were stolen per day. At current market prices that is over $8 million per day or nearly $3 billion per year, and sometimes more. The Daily Independent reported that Nigeria lost $46 billion due to oil theft between 2009 and 2020 – between 5% and 30% of its daily oil production.

     By hot tapping into a high-pressure pipeline and diverting the oil through an illegal pipeline these operations can remain undetected as there is little loss of pressure. Oil is also siphoned from terminals into trucks and sold to nearby African countries at higher prices. Oil is also transferred to nearby illegal hidden refineries and refined products are sold to the local population.

     According to Wikipedia: “Since the presidency of Ibrahim Babangida from 1986 to 1993 and his appointment of officials to supervise the oil producing sectors, the Nigerian military has maintained extensive control over the crude oil trade. The military personnel and Joint-Task Force members that are involved in the illegal oil trade primarily serve as armed escorts for the stolen petroleum products during large-scale operations and gather the intelligence that is necessary for avoiding government probes in the region.” The Nigerian navy seizes some illegal oil shipments by sea but is also sometimes complicit in helping illegal ships on their way or helping captured ships to disappear. Buhari was the first president to focus heavily on prosecuting the oil theft corruption beginning in 2015. The new Nigerian president Bola Tinubu is continuing that prosecution. The culture of corruption in oil theft is long-established, widespread, and will be difficult to root out. Sabotage, presumably referring to just creating spills, has been going on since the 1990s but began in earnest by the Niger Delta Avengers after Buhari took power in 2016. Chevron’s pipelines were mainly targeted. The Council on Foreign Relations noted in a 2019 report: As a consequence of the high influx of oil pipeline sabotage in the Niger Delta, “oil spills have “devastated mangroves, contaminated soil and groundwater, destroyed the fish habitat, and posed a serious threat to public health.” Decades of oil tapping and years of “bush refineries,” have also contributed to the widespread pollution in the Niger Delta. In the 1970s and 1980s, most oil spills were caused by well blowouts and corrosion of aging pipelines. The first spills due to sabotage by locals or illegal tapping were reported in 1982.  

     Illegal refineries are located in the many creeks hidden in the brush. Oil is delivered by boat. The BBC described the process: “A fire is lit in a pit under the cauldron and the crude oil is heated and condensed into different petroleum products from kerosene to diesel. The heated oil is then funnelled into a cooling chamber.” Illegal refinery explosions and fires have killed many people. In April 2022, 100 people were killed in an explosion. In March 2023, 12 people were killed in a blast. 25 people died in a blast in October 2021. The makeshift refineries are clearly very dangerous. 200 people were killed in an explosion in 2004 and 300 people were killed in two explosions in 2006. These are just some of the deaths I could dig up. There were likely many more. The Niger Delta is also the location where one of the highest fatality rates occurred at a pipeline explosion. This was the 1998 Jesse pipeline explosion. According to Wikipedia: “On October 18, 1998, a pipeline explosion occurred in the community of Jesse (180 mi) southeast of Lagos, Nigeria. The cause of the blast has been debated. The Nigeria government stated the explosion took place after scavengers intentionally ruptured the pipeline with their tools and ignited the blaze; however, others have stated the pipeline ruptured due to a lack of maintenance and neglect with a cigarette igniting the fire. With 1,082 deaths attributed to the blast, the 1998 Jesse explosion has the distinction of being the most deadly pipeline explosion to have occurred in Nigeria.” The fire was eventually put out by oilfield firefighters from the U.S. with nitrogen foam. Many people died up to weeks later from their injuries.

      Nigeria has high unemployment, especially in the Niger Delta area. The oil theft enterprise offers lucrative work opportunities. That is another factor that makes it hard to root out. Workers may camp at the illegal refineries for weeks at a time and often work at night as well. Bribery and widespread involvement from many sectors of society, including government and law enforcement keep the corruption safe to continue. Until there are significant alternative means of employment in the area, it will continue.  

     The illegal refineries cook the oil and flare off gases including methane and VOCs which make soot. This black carbon hangs in the air as clouds of air pollution. Legitimate refineries contribute to this pollution as well, but obviously have much better separation of components and much cleaner flares. Cooking the crude oil in these makeshift refineries produces massive amounts of soot for those who do the work. Respiratory diseases are high in the general area.

     The Nigerian National Petroleum Company Limited made efforts in 2022 to crackdowns on oil theft and illegal refineries. They reported 93 illegal pipeline connections discovered, 69 illegal refineries destroyed, and 30 oil transport boats confiscated in the Niger Delta in one week in July 2022. They also reported five offshore oil spills during that time. One problem is that when there is a crackdown, the militant groups threaten more sabotage. After illegal refineries are destroyed new ones pop up. In another week in August 2022, 53 illegal refineries and 35 illegal pipeline connections were discovered in one area. Oil spills were also recorded. Premium Times reported in July 2021: “According to the National Oil Spill Detection Agency (NOSDRA) data, the total number of oil spills recorded from 2015 to March 2021 is 4,919…” This resulted in the spilling of 235,206 barrels of oil, or nearly 10 million gallons of oil. Soil quality has been severely degraded in some areas around spills and this will likely affect agricultural yields and end up exacerbating poverty.

     Just in the last few weeks now in September 2023, the Nigerian Defense Headquarters reports that the troops of Operation Safe Delta have uncovered and destroyed 89 illegal refining sites in the Niger Delta. They also “discovered and destroyed 21 dugout pits, 56 boats, 138 storage tanks, 235 cooking ovens, six pumping machines, one outboard engine, and two speedboats.” They also recovered quantities of refined products. There is also violence as it was also reported that they “neutralised 17 terrorists, arrested 11 suspected criminals and rescued two kidnapped hostages during the period” and recovered many weapons, including AK-47’s.

     Niger Delta oil theft and corruption is deeply rooted with decades of operations and many people have the technical and financial know-how to pull it off. Until there are effective alternative means of employment and other means of alleviating poverty in the region, it will likely continue. Unfortunately, Nigeria has little to no social welfare or safety nets. It is a country with a population the size of the U.S. but is much smaller than the U.S., a little bit bigger than Texas but smaller than Alaska. Government crackdowns on oil theft only slow it down a little and can escalate tensions. Unfortunately, the corruption is likely to continue as people need to make ends meet.

 

 

References:

Nigeria's illegal oil refineries: Dirty, dangerous, lucrative. Mayeni Jones and Josephine Casserly. BBC. April 27, 2022. Nigeria's illegal oil refineries: Dirty, dangerous, lucrative - BBC News

NNPCL intensifies anti-theft battle as oil output declines. The Punch. August 2022. NNPCL intensifies anti-theft battle as oil output declines (msn.com)

Oil theft in Nigeria. Wikipedia. Oil theft in Nigeria - Wikipedia

How troops destroyed 89 illegal refining sites in two weeks – Army. Ochogwu. Daily Post Nigeria. September 14, 2023. How troops destroyed 89 illegal refining sites in two weeks – Army (msn.com)

Nigeria records 4,919 oil spills in 6 years, 4.5trn barrels stolen in 4 years — Minister. Agency Report. The Premium Times. July 6, 2021. Nigeria records 4,919 oil spills in 6 years, 4.5trn barrels stolen in 4 years — Minister (premiumtimesng.com)

Oil spill incidents and pipeline vandalization in Nigeria: Impact on public health and negation to attainment of Millennium development goal: The Ishiagu example. Kenneth Aroh, Ini Udosen Ubong, and Eze Chibuogwu. February 2010. Disaster Prevention and Management An International Journal 19(1):70-87. (PDF) Oil spill incidents and pipeline vandalization in Nigeria: Impact on public health and negation to attainment of Millennium development goal: The Ishiagu example (researchgate.net)

1998 Jesse pipeline explosion. Wikipedia. 1998 Jesse pipeline explosion - Wikipedia

Power Grid Adequacy: Grids Need to Grow Ahead of Electrification

    Wood MacKenzie published an excellent opinion piece recently by Fahimeh Kazempour and Ken Norris - The Netherlands' gridlock: a cautionary tale for the US – that clearly showed the reasons for the extreme case in the Netherlands that arose due the energy transition getting ahead of power grid buildout. Interconnection delays for new power generation, mostly from renewables, have become common around the world since wind and solar are more complicated to integrate onto existing grids. The Netherlands case, however, is extreme in that interconnections for all non-residential loads and generation have been paused indefinitely since November 2022.

     The issue is grid congestion. What is grid congestion? Grid congestion occurs when transmission limits are reached and low-cost wind and solar resources are prevented from being fully utilized, which limits their market value. One solution is locally available energy storage. However, the high costs of deploying storage, mostly lithium-ion batteries, limits its availability. Variable and intermittent generation like wind and solar often leads to congestion. Where that generation is high there are generally backlogs in grid interconnection queues. It is one of the major grid integration issues associated with renewables. Wind and especially solar can be built quickly but if there are gridlocks such as transmission bottlenecks, that can lead to significant delays in this generation actually coming online. That can strain the economics of project developers. With pledges and goals to accelerate renewables come more congestion issues that end up curbing that acceleration if transmission bottlenecks are not relieved.  

     While the EU’s ban on Russian natural gas is a factor, it seems that Dutch regulatory policy is the main reason for the pause. The WoodMac article gives three main reasons for the Dutch congestion: 1) sustainability targets, electrification incentives, and the ban on Russian gas have led to increased demand far beyond forecasts. Heat pump and EV adoption have grown quickly. 2) EU NOx emissions regulations – the Netherlands has used up its allotment of those emissions due to the high agriculture sector NOx emissions, so other projects like grid expansion have not been able to get permits. That seems a bit silly to me. There seems to be a need for practicality since it is estimated that 25-75% of grid expansion projects are on hold while there are negotiations with the ag sector to meet the NOx requirements. 3) Inadequate investment in grid expansion as the previous cycle underestimated the need to fund an expanded grid to accommodate more renewables.

     Generation congestion had been well forecasted for some time, but load congestion was not. Some areas of the Netherlands are known to have little to no capacity for renewable generation. However, now, in addition to that, congestion charges – costs paid by the load that would not be paid if the transmission system was congestion-free – have increased 340% from 2019-2023. As can be seen below on the graph there is now significant generation congestion as well as load congestion in many areas.

 

 

     The WoodMac analysts consider whether the U.S. will be in the same boat in the future as renewable penetration increases. They conclude that it is not likely in the near term. In the Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO) region renewable generation grew from 11% to 17% from 2019 to 2023, and congestion costs rose by 293% over that period. That region, which is wind-heavy and solar-medium-heavy is not expected to reach renewable penetration comparable to the Netherlands until 2028, but that may be optimistic as public opposition to renewables continues and projects are delayed. Supply chain issues are also occurring. Meanwhile, the number of projects in the interconnection queues has been growing due to the IRA. The number one obstacle in the U.S. to getting those projects built is the lack of transmission capacity. A lack of incentives, permitting issues, and transmission buildout time is keeping that lack. Even though new transmission incentives are not likely to get more projects online in the near term, reforms may actually lower the number of projects in the queue since many are just in there to increase the odds of success and that will be less of a useful strategy with reforms. Compared to the Netherlands, electrification in the U.S. is likely to be much slower. One reason is the widespread availability of inexpensive natural gas. Heat pumps and EVs are not being adopted at high rates and are not expected to for a while yet. WoodMac predicts an annual electrification increase of 21% from 2023-2030. Capacity inadequacy is predicted in California, New York, and Texas mainly. The U.S. does not have NOx requirements like the Netherlands but permit issues significantly delay transmission projects so there is some comparison there. Relief may be on the way but as mentioned it won’t happen quickly. Utilities are gearing up for grid investments with better returns, so the bottleneck will likely be relieved. That is not likely in the Netherlands, unfortunately. $13 billion from the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law dedicated to grid upgrades will help in the U.S. with an equal amount of private capital expected to match it. However, supply chains, materials, and parts availability need to keep up once deployment begins. I would guess that the period from 2025-2030 will be one of significant grid upgrades and transmission buildouts in the U.S.  

     In the MISO region, it has just been reported that the average time from clearing out of the interconnection queue to turning them online is 2 years. Recently 49GW, mostly solar (31GW) with some gas, wind, and storage, has cleared the queue so we should expect that capacity to come online in 3Q 2025. The numbers are similar for PJM Interconnection region. Meanwhile in MISO there is a projected shortfall of 2.5GW for 2025-26 planning year and a 9GW shortfall for 2028-2029 planning year. Resource adequacy is the expected problem for MISO rather than congestion. New loads are expected on the system so resource adequacy is likely to be the main issue in the near term. As noted, help is on the way. A $9.1 billion transmission project is in the works to be built in a 1–3-year time span. The reasons for the delays in getting generation online are shown in the graph below. 

 

References:

The Netherlands' gridlock: a cautionary tale for the US. Fahimeh Kazempour and Ken Norris. Wood MacKenzie. September 5, 2023. The Netherlands' gridlock: a cautionary tale for the US | Wood Mackenzie

US grid interconnection backlog jumps 40%, with wait times expected to grow as IRA spurs more renewables. Emma Penrod. Utility Dive. April 11, 2023. US grid interconnection backlog jumps 40%, with wait times expected to grow as IRA spurs more renewables | Utility Dive

MISO: 49 GW has received interconnection approval, but projects face major delays. Ethan Howland. Utility Dive. September 14, 2023. MISO: 49 GW has received interconnection approval, but projects face major delays | Utility Dive

IEEFA Blue Hydrogen Study Has Some Inaccuracies and Biases

    The Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA) just released a report condemning blue hydrogen. They released a report in 2022 condemning CCS that was biased and strongly criticized, and this report should be regarded similarly. While this organization may seem to be scientific, I contend as I have before that their science, while intriguing, is often biased. The stated goal of the organization is to accelerate the energy transition, apparently by any means necessary, except any that include mitigating fossil fuel emissions.

     According to devex.com:

“The Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA) conducts research and analyses on financial and economic issues related to energy and the environment. The Institute’s mission is to accelerate the transition to a diverse, sustainable and profitable energy economy.” 

“The Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis receives its funding from philanthropic organizations. They gratefully acknowledge their funders, including the Rockefeller Family Fund, Energy Foundation, Mertz-Gilmore Foundation, Moxie Foundation, William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Growald Family Fund, Flora Family Fund, Wallace Global Fund,  and V. Kann Rasmussen Foundation.”

 

     Most of the above foundations are big funders of environmentalists and basically IEEFA should be considered to be by extension an environmentalist organization, perhaps more equivalent to Sierra Club and the NRDC, more so than say Environmental Defense Fund, which is somewhat less biased against fossil fuels and willing to admit and engage with making them less emissions intense rather than focusing directly on their demise.    

  

     It is suggestive by the rather aggressive title of the paper - Blue Hydrogen: Not Clean, Not Low Carbon, Not a Solution: Making Hydrogen from Natural Gas Makes No Sense - that includes 3 “Nots” and a “No” that the report is leaking bias. Since the group's name suggests it is a group of scientists and social scientists and one would assume that scientists are unbiased, the title itself is a kind of red flag. As I do see IEEFA papers highlighted in power and energy information hubs like Utility Dive and in news stories, I think their conclusions should be scrutinized, especially as they make these bold assertions and condemnations. Below I will examine their conclusions and attempt some rebuttals.   

 

     The paper has four key takeaways:

1)     The U.S. underestimates methane emissions from the upstream through the downstream oil and gas sector. While that may be true for a few areas, it is probably not true on the whole or on average. In addition, oil & gas methane emissions are continuing to drop throughout the U.S. in all sectors of oil & gas. It is certainly not true in two of the main areas of planned H2 projects – Appalachia and the Haynesville Shale region. There the model assumptions are right on.

2)     The U.S emphasizes the global warming potential of 100-year CO2equivalent emissions when it should emphasize 20-year CO2eq emissions. It is often stated that methane has a GWP of 84 times that of CO2 in the near term. While it is true that methane has a higher GWP in the near-term we should consider how long the near-term is. A caveat to that statement should be the fact that methane does not persist in the atmosphere: “According to MIT Climate Portal, methane lasts in the atmosphere for about a decade on average, while CO2 can persist for centuries. Source: MIT Climate Portal. 2: According to NASA’s Vital Signs of the Planet, methane has a relatively short lifespan of 7 to 12 years in the atmosphere, while CO2 can persist for hundreds of years or more. Source: NASA.” 10 years from now or maybe sooner all the methane that leaked into the atmosphere will be gone while much of the CO2 will remain for an additional 100-300 or more years. That means in order to get a GWP equivalency we have to consider that the methane emitted in say 2013 is now no longer present but the CO2 emitted in 1913 is still largely present. The higher near-term GWP of methane has led to more emphasis on these emissions as a way to mitigate climate change but that mitigation too will be in the near term. In explaining why we use 100-year equivalencies, MIT scientists put it this way: methane does its damage quickly but soon fades away, while CO2 traps a smaller amount of heat consistently, decade after decade. Another thing we should consider is that the U.S. is not one of the top 3 global methane emitters. China, India, and Russia each emit more methane than the U.S.

 

3)     They note that hydrogen does have an effect on global warming when it enters the atmosphere. While the EPA notes that the GWP of hydrogen is 0 and this is true, it does indirectly affect increase global warming by combining with other molecules in the atmosphere to make and/or retain greenhouse gases, mainly methane, ozone, and also water by reacting with hydroxide ions in the reaction H2 + OH = H2O + H. It can also react with nitrogen oxides and VOCs.

 

 

 

Thus, hydrogen can be considered to be an indirect greenhouse gas. Studies suggest that its GWP is about 20% that of CO2 over the standard 100-year period. A June 2023 paper in Nature Communications Earth & Environment came up with a GWP for hydrogen (indirect) of 11.6 (+- 2.8). The paper suggests that previous studies did indeed underestimate the indirect effects of fugitive H2 by about half. Since H2 reacts with other greenhouse gases, it is unclear if the changing of those gases was subtracted out or not. I am guessing they were. While not a direct greenhouse gas hydrogen does change the abundances of the greenhouse gases methane, ozone, and stratospheric water vapor, as well as aerosols. The effect on aerosols is much less than the other three. The graph below shows the relative effects on methane, ozone, and stratospheric water vapor.

 

 

      In any case, there is likely some truth to this assertion that could bring down the benefits of blue hydrogen a small amount but these quantifications are still in the early stages and more research is likely needed. One of the biggest uncertainties is how much H2 is taken up by the soil as soil is a known H2 sink. While the benefits of blue hydrogen may have been overestimated a bit, pending a better understanding of leakage rates now and in the future, that overestimation (even with their own conclusions) is not enough to change the fact that producing and burning blue hydrogen reduces emissions significantly over burning methane, even if there are new possible leakages to consider. Hydrogen is a very small molecule so it does have the ability to leak. However, as I have argued before, the best places to develop H2 projects are very near the point of use so that leakage rates and compression costs will be minimized. They can be placed very near power plants where they can be blended in as needed. This makes economic and emissions sense.    

4)     They contend that CO2 capture rates will not be as high as predicted. I think they may be way off the mark here. They make comparisons with projects like the Petra Nova coal plant CCS project where carbon was captured by retrofitting onto an old coal plant flue system. Hydrogen synthesis is done at high pressure, which makes it much easier to get a higher capture rate than from a thermal power plant flue which flows combustion gases at low pressure. As I understand it, carbon capture rates for steam methane reforming (SMR) and autothermal reforming (ATR) are very high, about 90% with SMR and 97-98% with ATR. That is based on a webinar with an Equinor executive in early 2022. I see that the DOE models they are giving have SMR capture rates much higher than 90%. ATR also requires oxygen which must be sourced and delivered. Some could come from nearby green hydrogen production since it is a byproduct of making hydrogen with electrolyzers. It may also be an obtainable byproduct of nearby industries as it is in some H2 projects. It is estimated that 5-10% of the energy in the produced hydrogen will power the CCS system and another 5% would more than cover any upstream methane emissions, especially in areas like Appalachia where natural gas is very inexpensive and upstream methane leakage rates are typically 1% or less. Thus a total of 10-15% (probably closer to 10%) of the energy in the hydrogen would cover emissions and running the CCS system. That would mean for an SMR blue hydrogen system in the Appalachian region, at a 90% capture rate, the result would be about an 80% reduction in emissions before considering the possible effects of any leaked hydrogen.

 

     The IEEFA paper makes model conclusions based on 20-year GWPs and 2.5% methane emissions rates, although they do include 1% emissions rates and 100-year GWPs as well. The list of methane emissions studies by basin that they give includes two studies from the Appalachian Basin Marcellus that do have very low emissions rates as verified but many others from predominantly oil basins, mainly the Permian and the Bakken, that due partly to flaring have much higher emissions rates and the gas from those basins is associated gas, or gas that comes in addition to oil production. No studies come from the Louisiana Salt Basin Haynesville Shale which also has low emissions similar to those of Appalachia. While some hydrogen projects may come from the Permian Basin and the Western Gulf Coast Basin Eagle Ford Shale region, most are likely to come from the Appalachian and Haynesville regions, where gas is abundant and cheap, and there is abundant nearby industry and power plants to utilize the hydrogen. Thus, the baseline given as the default methane emissions rate of 1% is likely to be much closer to most of the reality than the 2.5% that they favor. They base this on the largely discredited calculations of Cornell’s activist scientist Robert Howarth, who calculated a U.S. average of 2.6% and a mean of 3.5%. It should be pointed out that these methane emissions determinations have the most influence over their conclusions, much more than the 20-year CO2eq GWP, the carbon capture rate variances, and the H2 leakage effects. Thus, the biggest debunk here is their use of inaccurate methane emissions rates.

 

     In determining capture rates for H2 projects they only consider older, past H2 projects, some with CO2 sequestration issues that rendered capture rates lower than planned. While that could also happen with some newer projects, it is more likely that modeled capture rates will be achieved, if not immediately, then in time as issues are worked out. Some of those older projects were not designed for maximum capture rates, and new and better technologies are available now.

     IEEFA uses the DOE clean energy standard emissions rate of 4 kgCO2e/kgH2 as a line on their graphs. Below the line meets that standard but it should be noted that this is just an arbitrary line. While it is absolutely true that emissions intensity depends on methane emissions rates, carbon capture rates, hydrogen leakage rates, and at least in the near-term on the higher near-term GWP of methane, even at those somewhat higher emissions intensities that they claim, these projects are still likely to mitigate emissions quite significantly at reasonable costs. Even if one were to assume 85% capture rates and 2.5% methane emissions with the emissions more than tripling the reductions in emissions are still significant. Even so, I tend to favor the direct use of natural gas over hydrogen due mainly to cost issues and logistics. I favor blue hydrogen for cheap gas areas like Appalachia at locations very near point-of-use, as little transport and storage as possible, and so-called turquoise hydrogen through techniques like methane pyrolysis that can be integrated with renewables. Some can even produce usable carbon products like carbon black so those are CCUS but direct CCS projects are fine too. I am not overly bullish on hydrogen, except perhaps geologic hydrogen if it were found in abundance, so I may actually have some agreement that blue hydrogen is not a solution per se. It is just one tool among many. Due to cost blue hydrogen is much more feasible than green hydrogen.

     Overall, my qualms are mainly with the methane emissions rates and a bit with the insistence on near-term GWPs and capture rates. I think they are dead wrong about the methane emissions rates they prefer, are a little off on GWP emphasis although it should be considered, and probably off on the carbon capture rates, or at least will be soon enough. They may be correct about H2 leakage but the jury is still out and I think synthesis near the point of use will keep leaks to a minimum.

 

References:

Blue Hydrogen: Not Clean, Not Low Carbon, Not a Solution: Making Hydrogen from Natural Gas Makes No Sense. David Schlissel and Anika Juhn. Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis. September 2023. Blue Hydrogen Not Clean Not Low Carbon_September 2023.pdf

Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis. Devex.com. Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA) | Devex

Why do we compare methane to carbon dioxide over a 100-year timeframe? Are we underrating the importance of methane emissions? Andrew Moseman and Jessika Trancik. MIT Climate Portal. Why do we compare methane to carbon dioxide over a 100-year timeframe? Are we underrating the importance of methane emissions? | MIT Climate Portal

A multi-model assessment of the Global Warming Potential of hydrogen. Maria Sand, Ragnhild Bieltvedt Skeie, Marit Sandstad, Srinath Krishnan, Gunnar Myhre, Hannah Bryant, Richard Derwent, Didier Hauglustaine, Fabien Paulot, Michael Prather & David Stevenson. Nature Communications Earth & Environment volume 4, Article number: 203 (2023). A multi-model assessment of the Global Warming Potential of hydrogen | Communications Earth & Environment (nature.com)

Quadgeneration and Trigeneration Plants: Likely Future for Many Carbonated Beverage Plants, Breweries, and Horticultural Greenhouse Operations

     What are quadgeneration plants? Like combined heat and power plants, or cogeneration plants, they combine heat and power, but they also add cooling and CO2 capture. The heating often includes facility heating and some industrial process heating and likewise, the cooling often includes facility cooling and support for refrigeration. The CO2 captured is most often used on-site for carbonating beverages or for plants in greenhouses. It could also be sequestered or stored in wells, but this would add significantly to the cost and would not have the benefit of offsetting the cost of buying CO2.

     Additional benefits of quadgeneration plants include off grid capabilities to leverage against blackouts that can harm food industries, the ability to meet company emissions reduction goals and accompanying social benefits, and possibly selling excess heat or power to the local utility or neighboring businesses. The power for these systems comes mainly from natural gas reciprocating engines or small turbines, but renewable natural gas can be used if available, and hydrogen can also be added if and when available in the future. The CO2 scrubbers have the additional benefit of scrubbing NOx emissions as well, further reducing pollution from the natural gas engines. Since power is generated onsite it is usually cheaper to supply and cost benefits continue to accumulate after the initial costs of the engines or turbines are recouped. Greenhouses and other operations may not utilize cooling so they would be considered to be trigeneration plants. Carbonated beverage plants and some bakeries and processed food facilities can utilize quadgeneration plants.

 

 

    Quadgeneration Schematic. Source: Edina

 

Hug Engineering’s Codinox CO2 Fertilization System for Commercial Greenhouses

     Hug Engineering’s Codinox CO2 Fertilization System was first introduced in 1993 but has had many client-focused upgrades since then. It is in widespread use in the greenhouses in the Netherlands. The codinox system is designed to be compact, all-in-one, and plug-and-play. Hug Engineering claims significant cost-savings of their system over liquid CO2 dosing systems.

     Of course, CO2 fertilization in greenhouses enhances plant growth, typically by up to 40%. By making CO2 onsite, less or no CO2 has to be trucked in, resulting in further emissions reductions. Some beverage manufacturers have also upgraded their beverage delivery fleets to run on natural gas, especially if they have a tapable source near or on-site.

 

 

Codinox CO2 Fertilization System, Source: Hug Engineering 

Absorption Chillers for Cooling

     The cooling part of quadgeneration plants that can offer direct cooling support for refrigeration is provided by absorption chillers. Absorption refrigeration cycles differ from vapor-compression cycles in that the compressor is replaced by an absorber, pump and generator, while the condenser, expansion device, and evaporator are the same. The energy source is steam or hot water. The DOE describes absorption chilling as follows:

 

“Like a mechanical compressor in a vapor compression chiller, the thermal compressor takes low pressure/low temperature refrigerant vapor from the evaporator and delivers high pressure/high temperature refrigerant vapor to the refrigerant condenser. Instead of directly compressing the refrigerant vapor using a large amount of mechanical energy (typically electricity), a thermal compressor uses an absorbent fluid to chemically bond with the refrigerant vapor (essentially compressing it by changing phase from a gas to a liquid). This dilute solution of absorbent/refrigerant is easily pumped to the generator using a relatively small electric pump. In the generator, the refrigerant is boiled using thermal energy, and the refrigerant vapor then migrates to the condenser where it is changed back into a liquid refrigerant to begin the process over again. The absorbent is returned from the generator to the absorber to bond again with refrigerant vapor.”

 

 

 

 Absorption Chiller Schematic. Source: U.S. Dept. of Energy

 

Reciprocating Natural Gas Engines

     Reciprocating natural gas engines have been the power generation choice for cogeneration, trigeneration, and quadgeneration plants. More efficient aero-derivative gas turbines could also be used for larger operations as they are in larger cogeneration plants, but many greenhouses and beverage plants do not require that much power and are better served by reciprocating gas engines. While gas turbines provide the highest efficiency for higher output applications, for smaller power output needs reciprocating gas engines are more efficient. These engines also have very good start/stop capabilities. GE’s Jenbacher gas engines are in widespread use globally for these plants. They may also be equipped with digital power control systems to optimize efficiency. Caterpillar and Cummins also manufacture these engines and are in the market for these plants.

 

45Q Enhancements Will Likely Lead to More Tri- and Quadgeneration Plant Announcements in the U.S.

     The enhancement of the 45Q tax credits for carbon capture as part of the Inflation Reduction Act and the previous bipartisan infrastructure bill have already led to new announcements of trigeneration and quadgeneration plants and many more will likely follow. The higher market cost of CO2 in 2022 may also be a factor in self-supplying CO2. The higher cost was due to shortages in supply caused by sources such as ammonia fertilizer plants being offline for maintenance and ethanol plants being offline due to economics, and lower supply throughout the pandemic. Apparently, hot summers have also increased demand for cold carbonated beverages, including soda and beer.

     The Liberty Coca-Cola Beverage Company in Elmsford, New York is currently building a quadgeneration plant on their 21.5-acre site. They are partnering with experienced plant provider Clarke Energy and utilizing GE Jenbacher engines for power.  Liberty thinks the investment will pay out in 3.5 years with the help of the generous 45Q tax incentives. Liberty is also hedging against blackouts in New York which have been more common in recent years. The engines will provide them with 1.7 WW of electricity to power their needs. They plan to use some of the steam heat for sanitation processes. They plan to store some CO2 in tanks on-site, enough for 7-10 days. They also note that producing their own CO2 will offset the cost of buying 200 annual truckloads of CO2 and the accompanying diesel emissions of those deliveries. Liberty is a large operation that produces 41 million cases of beverages annually. This quadgeneration plant is part of their wider sustainability effort. They expect to begin the quadgen system operation in January 2024.  

 

 

 

 

References:

This Coca-Cola bottler will capture carbon dioxide to put the fizz in its drinks. Heather Clancy. Greenbiz. August 24, 2023. This Coca-Cola bottler will capture carbon dioxide to put the fizz in its drinks | GreenBiz

 

What is Quadgeneration? Edina. Quadgeneration | Combined Cooling Heat Power and CO2 Recovery (edina.eu)

 

Quadgeneration. Clarke Energy. Quadgeneration | Combined Cooling Heat Power and CO2 Recovery (clarke-energy.com)

 

Exhaust Gas Purification & CO2 Dosing: Greenhouse Power Generation: COdiNOx. Hug Engineering. COdiNOx _2018_15.08.18.indd (nes-wes.com)

 

The 3 Types of Absorption Chillers Explained. EnergyLink. January 5, 2021. The 3 Types of Absorption Chillers Explained | EnergyLink (goenergylink.com)

Absorption Chillers for CHP Systems. U.S. Department of Energy. May 2017. Absorption Chillers for CHP Systems (energy.gov)

CHP helps growth in the greenhouse. Gas Technology. August 25, 2017. CHP helps growth in the greenhouse | Plant Engineering

Your beer needs carbon dioxide, but the price skyrocketed over the summer. Bill Chappell. NPR. September 22, 2022. A carbon dioxide shortage threatens the beer industry : NPR