At the end of
2021 global nuclear power capacity was at about 390 GW. At COP28 in Nov/Dec
2023, 20 countries made an agreement to triple nuclear power capacity by 2050
to about 1170 GW. While that may seem possible on the surface, it also means nuclear
deployment must increase manifold. It would be an unprecedented increase. This pledge
to triple nuclear capacity by 2050 is full of recognitions and commitments that
are rather vague and seem quite aspirational rather than concretely achievable.
As the second graph below from the IAEA shows, the biggest historical increase in
nuclear energy deployment over an equivalent time period was an increase from
about 25 GW to about 340 GW from around 1970 to around 1995. The graph also
shows that nuclear deployment has barely budged over the past 30 years,
increasing by only about 45 GW. Thus, an increase of 780 GW over the next 26
years will be challenging, to say the least. In fact, over the last 30 years
nuclear power deployment has dropped a little in Europe and North America and
the only real growth has been in Asia.
In addition to
the problem of increasing total nuclear power capacity is the ongoing replacement
of retiring capacity, mostly due to age. This means that much more than 780 GW of
new capacity will be required by 2050 to reach the COP28 target. The graphs below from the IAEA show planned retirements and the age distribution of deployed nuclear power. The
IAEA notes:
“About 66% of total operational reactor capacity (257
GW(e), 289 reactors) has been in operation for over 30 years. Over 23% of
global operating nuclear capacity (91.2 GW(e), 117 reactors) has been in
service for over 40 years, while 1.9% of available capacity (7.3 GW(e), 13
reactors) been operated for over 50 years. The aging fleet highlights the need
for new or uprated nuclear capacity to offset planned retirements and
contribute to sustainability and global energy security and climate change
objectives. Utilities, governments and other stakeholders are investing in long
term operation and ageing management programmes for an increasing number of
reactors to ensure sustainable operation and a smooth transition to new
capacity.”
This means that most of the current nuclear capacity,
maybe 70%, will be well over 50 years old by 2050. That means that meeting the 2050
goal will require roughly 1000 GW or more of new nuclear power capacity. That seems
to me to be a very tall order that will be very difficult to achieve. In 2019
the IAEA put a report of nuclear power deployment forecasts to 2050. This had a
low case and a high case. The low case has nuclear power deployment declining
to 2040 and then increasing back to just 371 GW by 2050, less than today. The
high case put total nuclear deployment at 715 GW. Thus, I would argue that the
COP28 agreement seems to be purely aspirational as it would entail increasing
nuclear power by 455 GW, a factor exceeding the current total global nuclear
deployment, beyond that of the IAEA’s high case of just a couple years
previously. At this point, I have to say that the goal does not seem realistic
at all.
Another IAEA report from 2019 predicts that while global nuclear energy
production capacity is likely to stay the same or increase, in North America by 2050 it will either remain more or less
constant in the high case or decrease rather drastically in the low case.
Most Nuclear, Especially Advanced Nuclear is
Costing More and Taking Longer to Deploy Than Planned, Especially in the U.S.
Deployment
times and costs for nuclear reactors can vary considerably by region. The
reasons have to do with regulatory hurdles, workforce competence, cost of labor,
and levels of government incentives. A new report released in December 2023 by
Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs addresses the
uncertainties of the costs and construction duration of new nuclear projects. Advanced
nuclear, which is being pursued strongly in North America, is especially hampered
in terms of time and cost, with some seemingly insurmountable regulatory costs
and hurdles as well as the added costs of new technologies and first-of-a-kind
projects. The graphs below from the Columbia paper show some of the numbers
associated with nuclear deployments around the world in terms of cost and
construction duration. Here are the key findings of the report from the
executive summary:
● The limited number of new reactor builds in the United States in recent decades and the large number of new designs under development (some of which have never been built anywhere in the world) leave few data points from which to draw definitive conclusions on future nuclear costs.
● In countries such as China and India, construction expertise and supply chain efficiencies from ongoing nuclear power project buildouts and energy technology learning as well as lower labor costs, among other factors, have created more competitive economics for nuclear than are currently found in the United States.
● Modeling of nuclear energy costs in the US suggests that if the price tag ends up being much higher than the upper limits used in the studies cited, such as above $6,200/kW, new nuclear will play a marginal role, if any, in the US energy transition.
● Within the cost range quoted above, nuclear’s ability to play a substantial role in the United States (e.g., 50 gigawatts of deployment) could depend on factors including whether stronger decarbonization policies are enacted; whether other viable rm, low-carbon options emerge as competitive alternatives; whether difficulties with siting new transmission lines continue; and/or whether renewable energy expansion faces constraints.
● The new 30 percent tax credit in the Inflation Reduction Act available to both renewable and nuclear energy will substantially lower the cost of new nuclear reactors for US utilities.
● Internationally, scenarios by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change project that lower reactor costs in some emerging countries, in combination with strict climate mitigation policies, could result in very large new nuclear capacity expansion there.
● In modeling cases with high variable low-carbon power sources, the need for rm sources and storage options may be underestimated in the absence of greater temporal and technical granularity. This practice may omit costs associated with flexibility, market reserve, and storage that could be ameliorated by dispatchable nuclear capacity
NuScale Cancels Key Project and Downsizes Workforce
in Response to Costs and Regulatory Hurdles
One of the
most promising advanced nuclear projects in the U.S. involves the company
NuScale Power which is developing small modular reactors (SMRs). Unfortunately,
in November 2023, the company announced it was abandoning its main project in
Idaho where it planned to deploy 12 SMRs. They announced in January 2023 that
they had finally obtained approval for the project from the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC), with, many saying the project should have been approved years
earlier and at tens or hundreds of millions of dollars less in cost. Now, in
January 2024, NuScale has announced that they are laying off 154 full-time
employees, or 28% of its workforce. The loss of the Idaho project and
increasing costs led to the company burning through its cash reserves. NuScale
was funded by a special purpose acquisition company (SPAC) in 2022 with $236
million. NuScale’s stock dropped from $15 per share in August 2022 to $2.54 per
share in January 2024. The company launched in 2007 and has invested $1.8
billion so far. While they still plan to pursue the goal of getting from the
R&D phase to the commercialization phase, this setback is certainly tragic
and will slow U.S. advanced nuclear deployment. Other companies are continuing their
plans for SMR deployment. However, detractors are noting that traditional
nuclear reactors offer economies of scale that make them cheaper than SMRs. It
was previously hoped that SMRs would be commercialized in the late 2020s but
now it looks like the mid-2030s is a more realistic estimate.
Another important
reason for the scrapping of the project involves the availability and cost of nuclear
fuel to power their SMR design. That fuel is high-assay, low-enriched uranium (HALEU),
most of which is supplied by Russia. With availability and cost affected by the
Russian invasion of Ukraine. Geek Wire reports: “To replace the Russian
supply, Ohio-based Centrus Energy Corporation started manufacturing the fuel in
November 2023, with plans to scale production this year.”
References:
Portland-based
nuclear reactor company NuScale cuts 28% of workforce, or 154 employees. Lisa
Stiffler. Geek Wire. January 8, 2024. Portland-based
nuclear reactor company NuScale cuts 28% of workforce, or 154 employees
(msn.com)
Amid
Global Crises, Nuclear Power Provides Energy Security with Increased
Electricity Generation in 2021. Marta M. Gospodarczyk. IAEA Department of
Nuclear Energy. July 14, 2022. Amid
Global Crises, Nuclear Power Provides Energy Security with Increased
Electricity Generation in 2021 | IAEA
Energy,
Electricity and Nuclear Power Estimates for the Period up to 2050.
International Atomic Energy Agency, 2019. 19-00521_RDS-1-39_body.indd
(iaea.org)
The
Uncertain Costs of New Nuclear Reactors: What Study Estimates Reveal about the Potential
for Nuclear in a Decarbonizing World. Dr. Matt Bowen, Emeka Ochu, and Dr. James
Glynn. Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia, School of International and
Public Affairs. December 2023. QCFNuclearCosts-CGEP_Report_112923.pdf
(columbia.edu)
The
U.S. Project Meant To Debut Revolutionary Nuclear Reactors Just Fell Apart.
Alexander C. Kaufman. Huff Post. November 8, 2023. U.S.
Nuclear Reactor Project Crumbles Into Failure | HuffPost Impact
At
COP28, Countries Launch Declaration to Triple Nuclear Energy Capacity by 2050,
Recognizing the Key Role of Nuclear Energy in Reaching Net Zero. U.S. dept. of
Energy. December 1, 2023. At
COP28, Countries Launch Declaration to Triple Nuclear Energy Capacity by 2050,
Recognizing the Key Role of Nuclear Energy in Reaching Net Zero | Department of
Energy
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